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Abstract 
Alexithymia is defined as an inability to identify or experience emotions, and has been connected 
to both major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Both MDD 
and GAD are associated with a tendency to select maladaptive emotion regulation (ER) 
techniques. The present studies explored the relationship between alexithymia and subclinical 
depression/anxiety by proposing that alexithymia is a mediator of the relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and ER difficulty. Study 1 examined this relationship in the 
context of implicit, or automatic, ER, as assessed by an emotional conflict task. While the task 
failed to index implicit ER ability, this study fostered an understanding of the role of response 
windows in implicit ER paradigms. Study 2 explored this relationship in the context of explicit, 
or effortful, ER, as assessed by heart rate variability (HRV) and subjectively reported affect 
associated with an anxiety-inducing task prior to which participants were instructed to implement 
reappraisal. This study did not find alexithymia to be a mediator of the relationship between 
symptoms of depression/anxiety and ER, suggesting that alexithymia does not negatively impact 
individuals’ ability to engage in instructed reappraisal. However, based on the general failure of 
reappraisal on a physiological level, this study also suggested that the relative success of 
reappraisal is contextually determined. Finally, this study found depression and anxiety to be 
associated with heightened subjective distress, and pointed to a decoupling between 
physiological and subjective emotional experience in subclinical depression and anxiety.  
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Subclinical Depression, Anxiety and Alexithymia: Implications for Implicit and Explicit 
Emotion Regulation 
 Emotion regulation (ER), or the conscious or non-conscious modulation of one’s emotion 
states to meet the contextual demands of daily life (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 
2010; Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994), is a process with widespread implications for quality of life 
and functioning for both general and clinical populations. In the general population, ER predicts 
adaptive interpersonal sensitivity and prosocial tendencies (Lopes et al., 2005), and among 
individuals who report high levels of stress, those who are able to regulate their emotions tend to 
be happier (Extremera & Rey, 2015). Furthermore, deficits in overall emotional intelligence, a 
construct that assumes the ability to recognize emotions in the self and others as well as to 
regulate emotions to achieve goals (Colman, 2015), are associated with undesirable outcomes 
that include substance use, physical fights, and poor interpersonal relations (Brackett, Mayer, & 
Warner, 2004). ER is also implicitly tied to psychopathology. For example, the inability to 
successfully regulate emotions increases the likelihood that subclinical symptoms of disorders 
such as depression evolve into full-blown psychopathology (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008; Aldao et al., 2010), and can act as a maintaining factor for multiple 
disorders (Berking & Wupperman, 2012). 
With both the benefits of successful ER and the consequences of poor ER in mind, it is 
clear that an understanding of the psychological constructs implicated in ER difficulty could be 
instrumental in improving the quality of life of clinical and subclinical populations alike. 
Whether this knowledge is applied through targeted intervention aimed at training specific 
populations to use adaptive ER techniques or as a general educational tool, the benefits of a more 
complete understanding of what causes ER to fail are undeniable. Accordingly, the following 
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studies sought to investigate one construct that may play a role in ER difficulty in the context of 
depressive and anxious symptoms: alexithymia. 
Alexithymia 
In 1973, psychotherapist Peter Sifneos first used the term alexithymia, literally meaning  
“no words for mood”, to describe observed deficits in the emotional functioning of 
psychosomatic patients. Since then, alexithymia has come to be known as a multi-dimensional 
construct that refers to an inability to identify and describe emotions in the self (Sifneos, 1973). 
More specifically, alexithymia has been conceptualized with a two-factor model that includes a 
cognitive dimension, in which individuals struggle to identify and verbalize their emotions, and 
an affective dimension, in which individuals simply have difficulties experiencing these 
emotions (Bermond et al., 2007). Core areas of deficit associated with alexithymia include 
dysfunction in emotional awareness of the self and social attachment, where alexithymia is 
characterized by cold and socially avoidant behavior (Spitzer et al., 2005). In keeping with these 
broader areas of dysfunction, alexithymia also impairs empathy for and emotional understanding 
of others, as evidenced by a reduced tendency towards prosocial behavior in individuals with 
alexithymia (Feldmanhall, Dalgleish, & Mobbs, 2013). Due in part to the tendency for the 
personal emotional difficulties of alexithymia to manifest themselves as larger social deficits, it 
has been speculated that individuals with alexithymia may exhibit a reduced capacity to use 
social interaction as a means of emotion regulation (Spitzer et al., 2005). As such, individuals 
with alexithymia may rely disproportionately on internalized ER techniques, making the 
elucidation of the nature of alexithymia’s relationship with ER all the more important. 
While it was first defined in the context of psychosomatic disorders (Sifneos, 1973), 
alexithymia has been associated with other disorders, including mood and anxiety disorders 
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(Onur et al., 2013), and is also highly prevalent in the general population. When using cutoff 
scores specified by the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994a) – one of two scales that have largely driven research on alexithymia – the prevalence of 
alexithymia among the general population is as high as 13% (Salminen, 1999). Despite this 
cross-population prevalence, past studies have largely failed to explore the interplay between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and alexithymia on a subclinical level. The present studies sought 
to investigate this relationship in the context of ER by asking the following questions: could 
alexithymia engender depressive and anxious symptoms that interfere with ER ability? Or, by 
contrast, could alexithymia be a product of depressive and anxious symptoms that acts as a 
barrier to adaptive ER? To conceptualize these research questions, two mediation models were 
proposed. The first model (Model A; see Figure 1A) proposed that alexithymia would predict 
depressive and anxious symptoms, which, in turn, would predict difficulties with ER. The second 
model (Model B; see Figure 1B), on the other hand, proposed that depressive/anxious symptoms 
would predict alexithymia, which would subsequently act as a psychological mechanism through 
which such individuals experience difficulty regulating emotion. In order to further explore these 
models, however, alexithymia’s unique role in psychopathology must first be understood. 
Alexithymia and Psychopathology 
Although the present studies examined depressive and anxious symptoms on a subclinical 
level, recognizing the nature of alexithymia’s relationship with full-blown psychopathology is 
crucial for understanding its role in the context of depressive and anxious symptoms in the 
general public. While alexithymia is by no means a purely clinical construct and can be seen in 
varying populations, converging evidence has suggested that the presentation of alexithymia may 
be influenced by psychopathology. For example, while alexithymia has been found by meta-
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review to be a stable, personality-like trait in nonclinical populations, it is more variable in 
clinical samples (de Haan et al., 2012; Karukivi & Saarijärvi, 2014). In other words, while 
healthy controls tend to display constant levels of alexithymia across time, individuals with 
various psychopathologies may have more fluid, state-dependent levels of alexithymia. These 
variations are linked to the quality and severity of an individual’s symptoms. It is important to 
note, however, that distinctions between alexithymia in clinical populations and nonclinical 
populations may be present on more than just a state versus trait level. For example, Diborde et 
al. (2004) provide evidence for a distinction between the symptom presentation of alexithymia in 
clinical and nonclinical populations in the context of eating disorders. In their study, individuals 
categorized as alexithymic in a control group exhibited selective deficits in the emotional 
cognition dimension of alexithymia while maintaining functioning in the affective dimension. 
However, individuals with alexithymia in an eating disorder group were characterized by deficits 
in both the affective dimension and the cognitive dimension, suggesting that alexithymia affected 
the quality of the emotional experience only in clinical populations. 
A similar distinction between the presentation of alexithymia in clinical versus 
nonclinical populations can be seen on a neurobiological level. In individuals with major 
depressive disorder (MDD), for example, Ho et al. (2016) found alexithymia to be correlated 
with decreased functional connectivity in the right prefrontal gyrus and right-lateralized regions 
of the brain associated with cognitive ER in the default mode network (DMN) – a network that 
has been associated with emotional self-reflection and understanding emotion in others. 
However, in controls, alexithymia was associated with increased functional connectivity between 
the right inferior frontal gyrus triangularis and the right superior occipital lobe, a region 
associated with emotional response to exterior stimuli. Ho et al. (2016) suggest that this indicates 
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an association between alexithymia and reduced automatic ER and introspective thinking in 
participants with MDD, but not in healthy controls. By contrast, they posited the increased 
connectivity seen in healthy controls to be associated with difficulty evaluating emotional 
salience of external stimuli.  
While the studies above describe alexithymia on a broad clinical-versus-nonclinical level, 
the specific role alexithymia plays in psychopathology can be explored through its appearance as 
a common substrate of highly comorbid “distress disorders” MDD and generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD; Mennin et al., 2007; 2005). Although alexithymia is not a diagnostic construct 
per se, it has been consistently linked with both MDD (with 32.1% co-occurrence; Honkalampi 
et al., 2000; Onur et al., 2013) and GAD (Onur et al., 2013). In MDD, alexithymia is associated 
with symptom severity (Honkalampi et al., 1999). This linkage between alexithymia and distress 
disorders such as MDD and GAD certainly makes conceptual sense – as outlined in Model A, an 
inability to label or experience emotions in the self could conceivably play an intimate role in 
processes related to depression and anxiety, including the formation or preservation of 
ineffectual strategies of emotion management or maladaptive schemas about the self or the world 
at large (a feature especially relevant to MDD; Renner et al., 2012). Conversely, as seen in 
Model B, alexithymia could be a product of depression and anxiety, where chronic feelings of 
lowered mood or anxious thought lead to difficulty accurately conceptualizing one’s emotions. 
Indeed, Leahy (2002) found that the belief that one’s emotions are incomprehensible, 
uncontrollable, or somehow different than others’ was common in both depression and anxiety – 
a view that fits well with the concept of alexithymia.  
The prevalence of this construct in two frequently co-occurring disorders suggests that 
alexithymia may be related to areas of deficits shared by these disorders. Emotion dysregulation 
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– an integral component of both MDD and GAD (Aldao et al., 2010; Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 
2007) – may be one such area of common deficit in which alexithymia plays a critical role. As 
alexithymia involves deficits in emotional awareness and emotion labeling, it is conceivable that 
the ER issues that are common to MDD and GAD may be facilitated or exacerbated by the 
presence of this construct. For example, alexithymia may interfere with one’s ability to identify 
appropriate times to engage in regulation or limit the depth of emotional understanding necessary 
to properly implement adaptive ER techniques.1 In support of this notion, ER literature has 
suggested that alexithymia may be associated with maladaptive ER strategies. Chen et al. (2011), 
for example, found different manifestations of alexithymia to be associated with unique ER 
profiles. Of particular note, the general-high alexithymia subtype (GHA; corresponding to high 
scores on all three components of the TAS-20) predicted suppressive ER techniques. 
Furthermore, conscious emotional awareness – an area of deficit in alexithymia – appears to be 
necessary for the proper implementation of reappraisal (Subic-Wrana et al., 2014). Together, 
these findings suggest that the nature of one’s repertoire of ER techniques may be adversely 
influenced by the presence of alexithymia, offering support for the conceptualization of 
alexithymia as a mediator of the relationship between depressive/anxious symptoms and emotion 
dysregulation (Model B). 
 In further support of Model B’s proposed detrimental effect of alexithymia on ER, 
Mennin et al.’s (2007) model of emotion dysregulation implicated in anxiety and mood 
symptoms considers poor emotional understanding, or an inability to properly evaluate one’s 
emotional state (a key feature of alexithymia), to be an important factor in the failure to engage 
in ER. What’s more, this feature was found to be strongly associated with MDD independently, 
as well as comorbid GAD. Furthermore, although Mennin et al. (2007) initially predicted 
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heightened intensity of emotions to be implicated in emotion dysregulation, it was not found to 
be in any way predictive of their indices of maladaptive emotion management in MDD. This 
suggests that emotional intensity may simply be involved in emotion generation rather than 
emotion regulation, and that emotion dysregulation in individuals with MDD may stem from 
some other mechanism, such as alexithymia. The role of alexithymia’s deleterious role in MDD 
has further neurobiological support from Ho et al. (2016) who, as previously mentioned, found 
not only a differentiation between the nature of alexithymia in clinical versus nonclinical 
contexts, but also functional evidence for an association between alexithymia and reduced 
automatic ER in MDD. 
With the differentiation in alexithymia’s presentation in clinical versus nonclinical 
populations as well as its associations with maladaptive ER in mind, it can be said that the 
studies at hand were informed by the assumptions that A) alexithymia can be associated with 
unique deficits in populations with psychopathology, and that B) these deficits can include 
difficulty regulating emotion. 
Measurement of Alexithymia 
As previously mentioned, two scales in particular have largely driven research on 
alexithymia: the Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ; Vorst, 2001) and the 20-
item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20: Bagby et al., 1994a). The BVAQ identifies five traits 
typical of alexithymia: 1) difficulty differentiating between emotions; 2) reduced ability to 
fantasize; 3) difficulty verbalizing emotions; 4) difficulty emotionalizing, referring to one’s 
degree of emotional arousal in response to emotion-eliciting stimuli; and 5) reduced tendency or 
ability to analyze or otherwise reflect upon one’s feelings (Bermond et al., 2007). The TAS-20, 
on the other hand, splits alexithymia into three distinct sub-dimensions: Difficulty Describing 
DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, ALEXITHYMIA IN ER                                                           13 
	
Feelings (DDF), Difficulty Identifying Feelings (DIF), and Externally-Oriented Thinking (EOT; 
Bagby et al., 1994a). The BVAQ and the TAS-20 have both been psychometrically validated in 
clinical and subclinical populations alike, and tend to correlate well with each other (Vorst, 2001; 
Parker et al., 1993; Bagby et al., 1994a; 1994b). However, despite their apparent similarities, the 
BVAQ was developed to overcome several shortcomings of the TAS-20. For example, the TAS-
20 contains a non-consistent number of items in each sub-dimension, which result in some 
factors contributing more to the total score than others (Vorst, 2001). What’s more, the TAS-20 
has no explicit measure for “reduced fantasizing” and “reduced experiencing of emotional 
feelings” – both of which have been identified as key characteristics of alexithymia (Mann, 
Wise, & Shay, 1992).  
Sub-dimensions aside, it has also been speculated that the TAS-20 fails to measure a 
larger grouping principle of alexithymia. As previously indicated, alexithymia includes both a 
cognitive dimension and an affective dimension (Bermond et al., 2007). A study performed by 
Vorst (2001) suggests that the TAS-20 fails to measure this latter component of alexithymia. 
According to this study, the sum score of the cognitive subscales of the BVAQ (analyzing, 
identifying, and verbalizing of emotions) was found to be nearly statistically identical to the total 
score of the TAS-20, while the affective subscales of the BVAQ (emotionalizing and fantasizing) 
had little correlation with the TAS-20 sub-dimensions. Together, this suggests that the BVAQ 
may provide a more complete picture of the affective dimension of alexithymia than its 
counterpart. It is unclear, however, if the addition of this dimension produces significant changes 
in the predictive validity of alexithymia. The TAS-20’s EOT sub-dimension has been found to be 
predictive of more severe symptomatology after inpatient treatment for major depression 
(Günther et al., 2016), suggesting that certain aspects of alexithymia may attenuate the success of 
DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, ALEXITHYMIA IN ER                                                           14 
	
treatment intervention. Furthermore, Karukivi et al. (2014) found the DIF sub-dimension to be 
predictive of state and trait anxiety in late adolescence. Together, these findings suggest that the 
sub-dimensions proposed by the TAS-20 have some level of predictive value in the context of 
depressive and anxious symptoms, regardless of whether or not they successfully measure the 
affective side of alexithymia. 
Present Studies 
While past studies have identified a link between alexithymia and psychopathology, both 
as a risk factor and as a predictor of symptoms, its precise role in ER difficulty for individuals 
with subclinical depression and anxiety remains unclear. Accordingly, the present studies sought 
to explore the specific roles that subclinical symptoms of depression, anxiety, and alexithymia 
play in ER difficulties that are typical of MDD and GAD on a clinical level. As depression and 
anxiety disorders are often associated with emotion dysregulation, and alexithymia involves a 
shortcoming in one’s understanding or experience of emotion that may interfere with ER 
processes, these studies posited that A) subclinical symptoms of MDD and GAD would be 
negatively associated with ER ability, that B) symptoms of MDD and GAD would predict 
alexithymia, and that C) alexithymia would act as a mechanism through which individuals with 
symptoms of MDD and GAD fail to engage in ER. More specifically, the present studies 
predicted that alexithymia would mediate a negative relationship between depressive/anxious 
symptoms and ER ability, whereby the proposed relationship between symptom severity and ER 
ability would be attenuated when alexithymia was included as a predictor of ER ability. This 
hypothesis is in line with Model B (Figure 1B), and is informed by Chen et al.’s (2011) findings 
of distinct alexithymic profiles associated with different ER techniques, as well as Subic-Wrana 
et al.’s (2014) findings that suggest a role of emotional awareness in the selection of ER 
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strategies. Although the studies at hand predicted a specific outcome, the results were analyzed 
to examine Model A – which suggested alexithymia to be a predisposing factor for maladaptive 
beliefs about one’s self or one’s emotions that develop into depression or anxiety and subsequent 
ER difficulties – as well as Model B.  
While the relationship between alexithymia, depressive/anxious symptoms, and ER can 
be conceptualized using multiple models, it is equally important to note that ER can exist on 
more than one level. Namely, ER can be assessed through the examination of implicit (i.e., 
automatic) or explicit (i.e., effortful) regulation. While much of the research outlined above has 
examined alexithymia’s relationship with ER in general, this relationship has rarely been 
deconstructed to explore implicit versus explicit ER. To that end, Study 1 examined the proposed 
relationship between symptoms of depression/anxiety, alexithymia, and ER by focusing on 
implicit ER, while Study 2 explored this relationship in the realm of explicit ER. 
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Study 1 Introduction 
The question posed by Study 1 concerned implicit, or automatic, ER and its relationship 
with alexithymia as a potential mediator of the proposed association between symptoms of 
depression/anxiety and ER difficulty: is a lack of conscious awareness of emotions a barrier to 
successful subconscious ER, or are automatic tendencies unaffected by higher-level deficits? In 
order to explore this question, implicit ER must first be understood. 
Implicit Emotion Regulation 
ER occurs both implicitly, or automatically, and explicitly, or through effortful 
engagement. While these two processes occur on different levels of awareness, both implicit and 
explicit ER are necessary for wellbeing. Implicit ER, for its part, is automatically evoked by a 
stimulus, occurs subconsciously, and is important for healthy functioning in day-to-day life as it 
can effectively meet the high demand for moment-to-moment regulation without requiring the 
same level of conscious awareness as explicit ER (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). To illustrate 
this point, imagine a scenario where an individual is running late for a meeting at work. Without 
the capacity to implicitly regulate emotion, the individual would have to devote mental resources 
to engage in some form of explicit ER, such as reappraisal (e.g., “Being late for this meeting 
helped me miss the morning traffic and improved my drive to work.”). This may cause him to be 
distracted or unengaged during the meeting. If this process were able to occur automatically, 
however, the individual would be able to focus on the meeting while simultaneously processing 
the negative emotions generated by his late arrival. 
Although implicit ER occurs outside of one’s awareness, it can be just as useful as more 
effortful strategies at modulating emotion. In response to an anxiety-producing task, for example, 
unconscious regulation (elicited by subtly exposing participants to reappraisal-related words 
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prior to the task) was equally effective at diminishing physiological response when compared to 
explicit implementation of reappraisal (Williams et al., 2009). What’s more, (Yang et al., 2015) 
found that implicit ER reduced subjective emotional experience to both gains and losses in a 
gambling task without requiring cognitive resources, effectively insulating participants against 
the emotional effects of successes and failures in a decision-making context. Overall, these 
findings suggest that while implicit ER may not have historically received as much research as 
explicit ER, it is an important aspect of successful regulation in the course of daily functioning 
and bears significance to one’s experience of the world at large. 
Implicit ER involves a number of different processes, each of which corresponds to a 
unique area of the brain. As a whole, the implicit ER system likely includes the amygdala, 
hippocampus, and areas of the medial prefrontal cortex, including the subgenual anterior 
cingulate cortex (sgACC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the rostral/pregenual 
anterior cingulate cortex(r/pgACC), the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC; Phillips et al., 2015). Growing support suggests that this 
system – particularly the amygdala and medial prefrontal cortical regions – is modulated by 
serotonin (Phillips et al., 2015). The different regions comprising this system are related to the 
unique aspects of implicit ER, with the sgACC and vmPFC being implicated in automatic 
behavioral control, the r/pgACC in automatic attentional control, and the dACC, dmPFC, the 
hippocampus, and the vmPFC being important for automatic cognitive change necessary for 
subconscious error monitoring and rule-learning. Each of these components plays a critical role 
in one’s ability to subconsciously and automatically amplify, attenuate, or maintain a given 
emotion. 
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In the context of this study, implicit ER was operationalized using an adaptation of the 
classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) designed to create emotional conflict. This task – called the 
Emotional Conflict Task (ECT) – is composed of images of emotional faces with superimposed 
emotional labels (i.e., “fear”, “happy”) that either match the face’s affect or are incongruent. For 
incongruent trials, participants must suppress the emotional information presented by the word in 
order to correctly identify the affect of the face (Etkin et al., 2006). This process can be analyzed 
through behavioral data collected during this task, and acts as an index of implicit ER as it occurs 
without instruction and without participant knowledge (Etkin et al., 2010). The ECT has also 
been supported by neuroimaging studies. In the original study, Etkin et al. (2006) used the ECT 
in conjunction with fMRI to associate the phenomenon of emotional conflict resolution with the 
rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) – a brain region that has been shown to be implicated in 
implicit ER processes and, more specifically, in automatic attentional control (Phillips et al., 
2015). Past research with the emotional conflict task has revealed slowed performance in clinical 
samples, including among samples with GAD as well as comorbid MDD and GAD (Etkin & 
Schatzberg, 2011 and Etkin et al., 2010, as seen in Robinson et al., 2015). Slower performance 
on the ECT is thought to indicate reduced ability to engage in implicit ER as it suggests that 
participants are taking longer to successfully resolve emotional conflict. Although faster 
performance may also reflect abnormal ER (e.g., hypersensitivity to emotional stimuli), this 
phenomenon has not been associated with a particular disorder other than binge-eating disorder 
(Robinson et al., 2015). Based on these findings, participants with more depressive and anxious 
symptoms were expected to exhibit slower ECT performance in the context of this study. 
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Hypotheses 
Past research on alexithymia and ER has left the relationship between alexithymia and 
implicit ER largely unexplored. However, some inferences may be made based on the 
relationship between implicit and explicit ER. While implicit and explicit ER may be dissociable 
processes, they do have some level of interconnectivity. Rather than being confined to one level 
of awareness, ER processes can fluctuate between conscious and subconscious domains. Of 
particular note, the frequent use of an explicit ER strategy can render it implicit (Gyurak et al., 
2011). This is an important concept to consider as it implies that habitual utilization of any 
technique – adaptive or maladaptive – may have long lasting effects on one’s automatic 
regulation tendencies. As individuals with alexithymia are more likely to explicitly implement 
maladaptive ER strategies (Chen et al., 2011), this assumption suggests that alexithymia may be 
associated with a tendency to automatically implement maladaptive ER strategies, and therefore 
may act as a barrier to successful implicit ER. This notion is further supported by Ho et al.’s 
(2016) fMRI study that suggests that alexithymia may be associated with difficulty automatically 
regulating emotions on a neurobiological level. Together, these findings informed my 
hypothesis: alexithymia was predicted to mediate a negative relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and implicit ER ability, whereby the proposed relationship 
between symptom severity and implicit ER ability would be attenuated when alexithymia was 
included as a predictor of implicit ER ability. This hypothesis was consistent with Model B 
(Figure 1B). 
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Study 1 Method 
Participants 
Participants were 65 Bates College students (16 men, 49 women) recruited via an email 
announce system, Facebook events, or a Bates introductory psychology course. The study was 
approved by the Bates College IRB and standardized consent forms were made available before 
the study. Participants received either course credit or $5 as compensation. All participants were 
at least 18 years of age (with the exception of one 17-year-old who continued with the study 
despite being informed of the study requirements) and were comfortable reading directions and 
questions in English. The sample was 12.3% Black, 72.3% White, and 12.3% Asian. 10.8% of 
the sample identified as Hispanic or Latina/Latino. 
Materials 
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994a). As previously 
mentioned, the TAS-20 proposes three distinct sub-dimensions of alexithymia: Difficulty 
Identifying Feelings (DIF), Difficulty Describing Feelings (DDF), and Externally-Oriented 
Thinking (EOT; Bagby et al., 1994a). While it has been psychometrically validated in clinical 
and general populations (Parker et al., 1993; Bagby et al., 1994a; 1994b), it has been suggested 
that the TAS-20 fails to measure the affective component of alexithymia (Vorst, 2001). 
Alexithymia is a dimensional variable, and the score on the TAS-20 is therefore best analyzed as 
a continuous variable (as it was in this experiment). However, the authors of the TAS-20 also 
established categorical cut-off points, with scores equal to or less than 51 corresponding to non-
alexithymia, scores equal to or greater than 61 corresponding to alexithymia, and scores of 52 to 
60 corresponding to possible alexithymia (Bagby et al., 1994a). The TAS-20 judges alexithymia 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree) and includes 20 items, 
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such as “I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling” and “When I am upset, I don’t 
know if I am sad, frightened, or angry”. The TAS-20 has been characterized by a Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of .81 and has shown good test-retest reliability (.77; Bagby et al., 1994a), as 
well as strong convergent and moderate discriminant validity (Bagby et al., 1994b). 
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The 
CES-D is a scale used to assess depressive symptoms in the general population. However, the 
CES-D has also been shown to operate comparably to the Beck Depression Index as a screening 
tool for depression in clinical samples (Zich, Attkisson &, Greenfield, 1990). The CES-D asks 
participants to indicate how often they have felt a certain way during the past week, and uses a 
scale with 4 response categories (Rarely or none of the time [less than 1 day], Some or a little of 
the time [1-2 days], Occasionally or a moderate amount of time [3-4 days], and All of the time 
[5-7 days]). There are 20 items on the CES-D in the form of statements such as “I was bothered 
by things that usually don’t bother me”, and higher scores indicate higher levels of depression. 
The CES-D has been characterized by Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .81-.84 in community 
samples and .90 in clinical samples, and has shown strong convergent and discriminant validity 
(Radloff, 1977). 
The 7-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006). The 
GAD-7 is a brief clinical measure used for assessing GAD. The GAD-7 has been 
psychometrically validated and exhibits good agreement between administration via interview 
and self-report (Spitzer et al., 2006). While it was designed as a diagnostic instrument, the GAD-
7 has also been validated as a dimensional measure of GAD severity (Rutter & Brown, 2016) – 
the form in which GAD was primarily analyzed in the present study. The GAD-7 asks 
participants how often they have been bothered by a list of problems within the last 2 weeks, and 
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uses a scale with 4 response categories (0 = Not at all sure, 1 = Several days, 2 = Over half the 
days, 3 = Nearly every day). The 7 items that comprise this measure include problems such as 
“Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge”, and are followed by a question regarding functional 
impairments. Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety. The GAD-7 has been characterized 
by a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .92 in community samples and .90 in clinical samples, and 
has shown good test-retest reliability (.83) as well as strong convergent (Spitzer et al., 2006) and 
moderate discriminant validity (Beard & Björgvinsson, 2014). 
Emotional Conflict Task (ECT; Etkin et al., 2006). The ECT is a reinterpretation of 
the classic color/word Stroop task: a paradigm which involves a color word printed in 
incongruently colored ink (e.g., the word “red” printed in blue ink), and asks participants to 
identify the ink color. The ECT follows a similar design, but uses emotion words and emotional 
faces in the place of color words and colored ink. Namely, happy or fearful facial expressions are 
presented with the words “happy” or “fear” superimposed on them, and participants are asked to 
identify the facial expression while ignoring the emotion words. Stimuli are either congruent 
(e.g., happy expression/“happy” word) or incongruent (e.g., happy expression/“fear” word).  
148 stimuli were presented in ECT. Unlike the original task, which presented each 
stimulus for 1000 ms, the current version of the ECT was modified to have a response-dependent 
window of presentation with each stimulus remaining on the screen until the participant 
responded. This change was made in an attempt to emphasize differences in response times 
while reducing the number of inaccurate trials that had to be discarded. Stimuli were followed by 
a varying interstimulus interval of 3000-5000 ms (mean interval = 4000 ms) during which a 
central fixation cross appeared on the screen. Stimuli appeared in a pseudorandom order, with 
equal numbers of congruent-congruent, congruent-incongruent, incongruent-congruent, and 
DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, ALEXITHYMIA IN ER                                                           23 
	
incongruent-incongruent pairings. The gender, affect, and identity of the faces were randomized 
throughout the trials. Finally, in order to avoid repetition priming caused by repeated images, 
there were neither direct repetitions of images of the same face in combination with different 
words nor images of the same face/word combination. Participants were instructed to identify the 
affect of the faces as quickly and as accurately as possible by pushing response buttons that 
corresponded to “fearful” (“1” key) and “happy”  (“2” key).  
Like classic Stroop tasks, this task is associated with slower response times for 
incongruent stimuli. This effect is known as the congruency effect. Implicit ER is 
operationalized in this paradigm through changes in the congruency effect. Specifically, when 
the previous trial (trial n -1) is incongruent, emotional control is triggered. This reduces 
susceptibility to response conflict on trial n, leading to faster response times on trial n if 
presented with another incongruent stimulus.2 Implicit ER can therefore be quantified in this 
paradigm by contrasting response times on incongruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (cI; 
expected to be slower) with incongruent trials preceded by another incongruent trial (iI; expected 
to be faster). In this case, better implicit ER corresponds to a larger difference between iI and cI. 
This process has been suggested to occur outside of conscious awareness (Gyurak et al., 2011).  
Procedure 
After reviewing and signing the consent form with the researcher, participants responded 
to a number of questionnaires via the online survey program Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2015), 
including CES-D, the GAD-7, the TAS-20, and a set of demographic questions. Following the 
initial questionnaires, participants completed the ECT, which was integrated into the computer 
program e-Prime. Finally, after completing the ECT, the participants received a debriefing script 
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and either course credit or $5. All participants, regardless of symptom endorsement, were 
provided with a list of mental health resource. 
Study 1 Results 
Screening 
 Participants with total accuracy of 85% or less were excluded from further analysis (n = 
4) in an attempt to screen the data for individuals who did not successfully engage with the 
emotional conflict task (ECT). One exception was made for a participant who responded to one 
of the four blocks of the ECT with reversed key binding for fearful and happy faces (i.e., pressed 
the “2” key when presented with a fearful face and the “1” key when presented with a happy face 
instead of the opposite). Once the scores for this block were adjusted accordingly, the participant 
was included in further analysis as their corrected accuracy was above 85%. For the remaining 
61 participants, only accurate trials were considered. 
In order to screen the data for within-participant outliers, mean response times (RT) and 
standard deviations were computed for each participant. Using these values, z-scores were 
calculated for each trial. Trials with RTs that deviated from an individual’s mean RT by more 
than two z-scores in either direction were excluded from further analysis.  
Variables of Interest 
In order to assess the conflict resolution effect seen in Etkin et al. (2006), a variable was 
created by contrasting response times on incongruent trials preceded by another incongruent trial 
(iI) with response times on incongruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (cI; RTcI - RTiI). In 
this case, better implicit ER corresponded to a larger difference between iI and cI, or a larger 
RTcI - RTiI value.  
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Although RTcI - RTiI was the main variable of interest, implicit ER was also assessed 
through two other variables. One of these variables was simply mean RT for incongruent trials 
(RTI), which represented how long on average it took participants to respond to incongruent 
trials. Here, smaller RTI values corresponded to better implicit ER as it represented a faster 
response to trials in which the resolution of emotional control was required. In order to correct 
for within-participant variation of response time, RTI was also incorporated into a variable that 
contrasted RT of congruent trials with RT of incongruent trials (RTI - RTC). In this case, smaller 
values of RTI - RTC corresponded to better implicit ER. 
ECT 
In order to assess the general effectiveness of the ECT, the mean RT for trials that 
required emotional control (incongruent trials; I) was contrasted with the mean RT for trials that 
required no emotional control (congruent trials; C). As expected, the mean RT of congruent trials 
(M = 891.47 ms, SD = 243.02 ms) was significantly smaller than the mean RT of incongruent 
trials (M = 989.24 ms, SD = 279.74 ms), t(60) = 10.00, p < .001 according to a paired samples t-
test. Consistent with the goal of the paradigm, this analysis demonstrated that, on average, 
participants responded more quickly to trials in which there was no emotional conflict (C) 
compared to trials in which there was emotional conflict (I). At a basic level, this suggests that 
the suppression of an emotional response to an incongruent emotion word increased the amount 
of time it took to accurately identify the affect of facial images.  
To explore the main implicit ER variable of interest (RTiI - RTcI), the effect of conflict 
resolution priming in incongruent trials was assessed by contrasting the mean RT of incongruent 
trials preceded by congruent trials (cI) with the mean RT of incongruent trials preceded by 
incongruent trials (iI). Unexpectedly, no conflict resolution effect was seen in incongruent trials. 
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While the mean RT of iI trials (M = 985.11 ms, SD = 272.39 ms) was smaller than the mean RT 
of cI trials (M = 989.52 ms, SD = 290.27 ms), this difference was not found to be significant by a 
paired samples t-test, t(60) = -0.43, p = .671. A similar analysis run in the context of congruent 
trials (RTcC - RTiC), however, revealed a significant difference where the mean RT of cC trials 
(M = 871.83 ms, SD = 231.35 ms) was significantly smaller than that of iC trials (M = 901.48 
ms, SD = 251.27 ms) according to a paired samples t-test, t(60) = -3.38, p = .001 (see Figure 2). 
These findings stand in direct opposition to Etkin et al.’s (2006) original results, which showed a 
conflict resolution effect in the case of incongruent trials (where the mean RT of iI trials was 
significantly smaller than the mean RT of cI trials), but found no evidence of such an effect in 
the case of congruent trials as there was no emotional conflict present and therefore no priming 
of conflict resolution. As emotional conflict resolution could not have been influencing the RTs 
of trials in which there was no emotional conflict (i.e., congruent trials), further analyses were 
conducted to determine what was driving these effects. 
Due to the unexpected results outlined above, analyses were run to determine whether the 
observed effects were related to conflict resolution, as posited by Etkin et al. (2006), or whether 
they were driven by simple repetition priming. While there were no direct repetitions of images 
in the ECT, there were instances of category repetition (e.g., fearful face with happy word 
followed by another fearful face with happy word). To explore the possibility that category 
repetition affected participants’ responses to experimental stimuli, a paired samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the RTs of high conflict resolution trials (i.e., iI trials) in which category 
repetition occurred to trials in which repetition did not occur. If repetition priming were driving 
the observed effects, the mean RT of category repetition trials would be expected to be lower due 
to priming of a specific word category/image category combination.  Interestingly, while the 
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mean RTs of the two conditions were significantly different, this difference was not in the 
expected direction. Instead, the mean RT of category repetition trials (M = 1016.41 ms, SD = 
282.17 ms) was significantly higher than the mean RT of non-category repetition trials (M = 
935.66 ms, SD = 341.21 ms), t(60) = 2.62, p = .011. A similar analysis was run in the context of 
congruent trials to compare RTs of cC trials in which category repetition occurred to cC trials in 
which repetition did not occur. In this case, the observed effects were consistent with what would 
be expected from repetition priming, with the mean RT of category repetition trials (M = 816.15 
ms, SD = 301.55 ms) being significantly lower than the mean RT of non-category repetition 
trials (M = 908.93 ms, SD = 259.76 ms), t(60) = -3.16, p = .002. Together, these findings suggest 
that the ECT may not have acted as a valid index of implicit ER ability in the context of this 
study, and that subsequent behavioral results should be interpreted with caution. 
Depression, Anxiety, and Alexithymia 
All scales demonstrated acceptable levels of internal consistency. Cronbach’s alphas for 
the CES-D and the GAD-7 were .89 and .85, respectively. Cronbach’s alpha for the TAS-20 as a 
whole was .85. The DIF, DDF, and EOT subscales contained 7, 5, and 8 items and had 
Cronbach’s alphas of .87, .67, and .69, respectively.  
Due to the subclinical nature of the sample, depression, anxiety, and alexithymia were 
regarded as dimensional constructs. However, in order to get a sense of the overall levels of 
pathology within this sample, the CES-D, the GAD-7, and the TAS-20 were briefly examined on 
a categorical basis. Of the 65 total participants, 28 were above the cutoff point for depression, 18 
for anxiety, and 14 for both depression and anxiety using cutoff scores of 16 and 10, respectively 
(Kroenke et al., 2007; Radloff, 1977). Ten participants were above the cutoff point (61; Bagby et 
al., 1994a) for high alexithymia. 
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 Correlations. In order to assess the relationships between the independent variables (IVs; 
total score on the CES-D, the GAD-7, and the TAS-20) and several dependent variables (DVs) 
of interest, a number of bivariate correlation analyses were performed. The full results of these 
correlation analyses can be found in Table 1. 
To assess the relationships between participants’ scores on depression (M = 16.58, SD = 
8.89), anxiety (M = 6.82, SD = 4.27), and alexithymia (M = 46.94, SD = 11.46) scales – the CES-
D, GAD-7, and TAS-20, respectively – bivariate correlation analyses were run between these 
variables. As expected, these variables were highly positively correlated. Total score on the CES-
D was significantly correlated with total score on the GAD-7, r(62) = .71, p < .001, as well as 
total score on the TAS-20, r(62) = .59,  p < .001. GAD-7 and TAS-20 scores were also 
significantly correlated with one another, r(62) = .49, p < .001.  
Contrary to predictions, depression, anxiety, and alexithymia were not significantly 
correlated with variables indexing implicit ER ability. Bivariate correlation analyses were run 
between total CES-D, GAD-7, and TAS-20 scores and multiple implicit ER variables including 
incongruent adaptation (RTcI - RTiI), the difference between emotional and non-emotional control 
trials (RTI - RTC), and mean RT of incongruent trials alone (RTI). These analyses yielded no 
significant correlations. 
Regression analyses. In order to explore the mediation models depicted in Figure 1 in 
the context of implicit ER, a number of simple linear regressions were conducted. The difference 
between the mean RT for incongruent trials and the mean RT for congruent [RTI - RTC] was used 
as a DV in these analyses as it was the only index of implicit ER that accounted for within-
subjects variability in RT via subtraction while also demonstrating robust significant effects that 
were in line with what would be expected from emotional conflict resolution (i.e., the mean of 
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incongruent trials was significantly larger than the mean of congruent trials). For this variable, 
smaller values corresponded to faster responses to incongruent trials relative to congruent trials, 
which in turn indicated better implicit ER.  
 First, to explore Model A (see Figure 1A), a simple linear regression was calculated to 
predict RTI - RTC based on total score on the TAS-20, yielding a nonsignificant regression 
equation, R2 = .01, F(1, 59) = 1.79, p = .186. As this relationship was not found to be significant, 
no further mediation analyses were conducted. 
 In the exploration of mediation Model B (see Figure 1B), a simple linear regression 
found RTI - RTC to be predicted by neither total score on the CES-D, R2 = -.01, F(1, 59) = 0.18, p 
= .676, nor total score on the GAD-7, R2  = .00, F(1, 59) = 0.73, p = .396. As these relationships 
were not found to be significant, no further mediation analyses were conducted. 
Study 1 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of the relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms, alexithymia, and implicit ER ability. Two mediation models were 
evaluated. While total scores on the CES-D, GAD-7, and TAS-20 were highly significantly 
correlated, demonstrating the expected association between these three constructs, none of these 
scores were significantly associated with variables corresponding to implicit ER success. 
However, unexpected dissociation of behavioral data suggested that this finding might have been 
influenced by a failure of the experimental protocol rather than a lack of impact of 
depressive/anxious symptoms and/or alexithymia on implicit ER ability. 
Behavioral Data 
Etkin et al. (2006) – the original author of the emotional conflict task (ECT) – found that 
emotional conflict on trial n -1 led to a decreased RT in the face of emotional conflict on trial n. 
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Through further exploration of behavioral data, Etkin et al. (2006) attributed this effect to an 
anticipatory mechanism whereby participants’ ability to engage in emotional control was 
bolstered after being exposed to incongruent emotional stimuli on the previous trial. Etkin et al. 
(2006) dubbed this phenomenon emotional conflict resolution, and localized it to the rostral 
anterior cingulate cortex (rACC). In the context of this study, the emotional conflict paradigm 
was used as an index of implicit ER as it implicates subconscious modulation of emotion – 
participants unknowingly regulate their emotional response to the emotion word in order to 
accurately identify the affect of the face. However, while the behavioral data from Etkin et al.’s 
(2006) original study was consistent with what would be expected from emotional conflict 
resolution – with iI trials being significantly faster than cI trials, and cC and iC trials being 
statistically identical (as there is no emotional conflict in congruent trials and therefore no effect 
of emotional conflict resolution) – these behavioral effects were not seen in the present study. In 
fact, the behavioral data collected in the present study yielded an almost-opposite pattern of 
results: while there was no significant difference between mean RTs of iI trials and iC trials, cC 
trials were, on average, significantly faster than iC trials.  
In order to explore what was driving this effect, the behavioral data were analyzed to 
explore forms of priming outside of the realm of emotional conflict. While there were no direct 
repetitions of facial images in the ECT, instances of category repetition (e.g., fearful face with 
happy word followed by another fearful face with happy word) were unavoidable. This being the 
case, it is possible that the RTs of participants performing the ECT may have been more heavily 
influenced by the simple repetition of category pairs than by the effect of emotion conflict 
resolution. Failure to account for the influence of repetition priming has been a major criticism of 
the ECT’s non-emotional counterparts. For example, Mayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003) suggest that 
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certain cognitive control tasks – paradigms that, similar to the ECT, rely on the assumption that 
conflict monitoring processes trigger top-down control on trial n when presented with a (non-
emotional) incongruent stimuli on trial n-1 – may be failing to recognize the influence of bottom-
up, or stimulus-driven, effects such as repetition priming. Indeed, Mayr et al. (2003) demonstrate 
that repetition priming accounts for a larger proportion of the behavioral effects typically 
conflated with conflict monitoring than was reflected in past research with cognitive control 
paradigms. Fortunately, Etkin et al. (2006) had the foresight to check for this effect. In their 
study, mean RTs of category repetition trials would be expected to be significantly faster than 
mean RTs of non-category repetition trials if repetition priming were driving the observed effects 
– a comparison that was performed in Etkin et al. (2006) and yielded no significant difference 
between the category repetition and non-category repetition groups. In the context of the present 
study, however, this analysis revealed category repetition trials to be significantly faster than 
non-category repetition trials within the context of low conflict resolution trials (i.e., cC trials). 
This suggests that the unexpected significant difference observed when comparing cC and iC 
trials may have been driven by repetition priming, whereby the responses of participants 
susceptible to the quickening effects of category repetition – a phenomenon that, by definition, 
can occur only in cC trials and not in iC trials – drove the average RT of cC trials down 
compared to iC trials that involved no instances of category repetition. 
In the case of incongruent trials, however, a different pattern emerged. Rather than being 
faster than their non-category repetition counterpart (as would have been expected from 
repetition priming), the mean RT of iI trials in which there was category repetition was, 
somewhat paradoxically, significantly slower than the mean RT of iI trials in which there was no 
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category repetition. This suggests that something other than repetition priming was driving the 
unexpected lack of emotional conflict resolution seen within the context of incongruent trials.  
At this point, is important to remember that the version of the ECT used in this study 
differed from the original task on the basis of response window. While Etkin et al. (2006) used 
both response time and accuracy as metrics of validation for the task, the present study sought to 
operationalize one’s ability to engage in implicit emotion regulation using only RT. As such, the 
RT data acquired from this paradigm was more highly valued compared to accuracy data. In 
pursuit of more clearly distilled RT data, the relationship between speed and accuracy in the 
experimental paradigm was manipulated: while Etkin et al. (2006) imposed a 1000 ms response 
window on each stimulus, with the stimuli disappearing and being marked as inaccurate if no 
response was given within the set time constraints, the present study removed this response 
window, meaning the stimuli progressed only when a response was given. Participants were, 
however, still instructed to respond both as quickly and as accurately as possible, and no 
participant took longer than the allotted 35 minutes to complete the protocol as a whole. The goal 
of this alteration was to afford participants adequate time to respond to more time-consuming 
stimuli such that any difficulties in resolving emotional conflict would be fully reflected in the 
behavioral data. In other words, if a participant with deficits in the realm of implicit emotion 
regulation had such difficulty with emotional conflict resolution that the incongruent trials took, 
on average, over 1000 ms to resolve, an unlimited response window would allow this effect to be 
registered in terms of RT instead of being marked as an incorrect response. 
While the intent of this change was specific and goal-oriented, it is possible that it may 
have given rise to unintended downstream effects that fundamentally altered the manner in 
which participants interacted with the ECT. For example, as the removal of the 1000 ms 
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response window afforded participants more time with which to familiarize themselves with each 
set of stimuli, this change could have rendered participants more susceptible to repetition 
priming – a phenomenon that was seen in the context of congruent trials and may have been 
responsible for driving the unexpected behavioral dissociation therein. Why this change would 
cause an opposite phenomenon to manifest itself within incongruent trials, however, proves to be 
a more difficult question. It is possible that increased opportunity for familiarization with the 
stimuli produced opposite effects within incongruent trials due to a sense of distrust associated 
with the presence of incongruent stimuli. The difficulty of responding to incongruent trials 
(reflected in the results by significantly higher mean RTs of incongruent trials compared to 
congruent trials) could have caused participants to second-guess category repeats (e.g., fearful 
face with happy word followed by another fearful face with happy word), opting to spend more 
time to double check their answer on category repetition trials to make sure they weren’t falling 
into an incorrect pattern of response. This suspicion of category repetition could be equated to a 
“multiple-choice test effect”, where students begin to get nervous after they fill in too many of 
any one letter choice on a multiple-choice exam. 
Implicit Emotion Regulation 
More detrimental in terms of the specific goals of this study, the removal of the response 
window present in the original ECT may have inadvertently destroyed the implicit component of 
this task. Although outliers in the behavioral data were removed through the process described in 
the Results section (meaning any trials to which participants took a disproportionately long time 
responding were not considered for further analysis), the potential downstream effects of such an 
alteration are undeniable. Indeed, the behavioral data revealed average RTs that were higher than 
Etkin et al.’s (2006) 1000 ms response window (the mean RT of incongruent category repetition 
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trials was, for example, 1016.41 ms), showing concrete and widespread effects of the altered 
response window on participant behavior. With these effects in mind, it seems likely that this 
paradigm failed in its goal to index implicit ER. This notion is supported on the level of the 
behavioral dissociation within the data, which shows little to no evidence of emotional conflict 
resolution, as well as on a conceptual level – as mentioned above, the absence of a response 
window may have allowed participants to familiarize themselves with the stimuli rather than 
forcing them to respond before more conscious processes take hold. In other words, rather than 
exhibiting participants’ ability to engage in top-down emotional control, the odd patterns of 
dissociation within the behavioral data beg a more stimulus-driven explanation of the task’s 
effects. 
Clearly, the proposed mediation models and predicted associations were not supported. 
However, due to the reasons enumerated above, it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions about 
the relationship between alexithymia, depressive/anxious symptoms, and implicit ER using this 
data. The one index of implicit ER that may have retained some of its validity (as explained in 
the Results section) is the contrast between incongruent and congruent trials (RTI - RTC). Based 
on the expected significant difference between these groups, it could be said that this measure 
maintained its intended role as an indicator of automatic emotional control. However, while 
regression analyses using RTI - RTC as a DV did not find significant relationships between this 
variable and total scores on the CES-D, GAD-7, or TAS-20, these results should also be 
tempered by the fact that the alteration to the ECT changed the way participants interacted with 
the task as a whole. 
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Strengths and Limitations 
 Besides the obvious limitation associated with the ECT’s failure to index implicit ER 
ability, it is also important to note that the sample, being made up of majority White college 
students between the ages of 17 and 22, was fairly homogeneous. While this homogeneity may 
contribute to the internal consistency of the data and allow stronger conclusions to be drawn 
about populations congruent with this sample, it certainly curtails the degree of generalizability 
of the findings. What’s more, this study was conducted using a non-clinical sample. This was 
consistent with the study’s goal of exploring the effects of alexithymia and depressive/anxious 
symptoms on implicit ER on a subclinical level – a series of relationships that have been left 
largely uninvestigated by past research. However, due to the subclinical nature of the sample, it 
is possible that the present study lacked the sensitivity necessary to registers effects that may 
have been more apparent in a more clinical sample.  
 Furthermore, in addition to historical criticisms of the TAS-20 outlined in the general 
introduction, Cronbach’s alpha scores of less than .70 on both the DDF and EOT subscales of the 
TAS-20 call into question the internal reliability of the scale. This suggests that these particular 
subscales of the TAS-20 may not be measuring a unitary construct. It is important to note, 
however, that the Cronbach’s alpha for the scale as a whole was well over .70, indicating a more 
robust overall internal consistency. 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
Overall, these speculations on the interaction between emotional conflict resolution and 
response windows act as both an exploratory examination of the effects of a response window on 
conflict monitoring tasks and as a cautionary tale. Despite undermining the original intent of the 
task, the removal of the response window provided compelling findings on the nature of the ECT 
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and other conflict-monitoring tasks. Interestingly, past research using non-emotional conflict 
monitoring tasks has not necessarily imposed a response window as part of the experimental 
design. These experiments, however, report only on the basic congruency effect, not the 
congruency effect as a function of the identity of the previous trial (e.g., Cohen & Shoup, 1997). 
Experiments that do break down their analysis to the level of cI, cC, iC, and iI (and witness 
appropriate dissociation of behavioral data as a result) tend to implement a response window that 
ranges from 30 ms in the context of simple stimuli to 1000 ms for more complex stimuli (e.g., 
Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005; Botvinick et al., 1999; Etkin et al., 2006). This suggests 
that while the basic congruency effect may be a durable effect, the congruency effect as a 
function of the identity of the previous trial may be more fragile. This conclusion is supported by 
my data, in which the simple removal of the response window seemed to have significantly 
interfered with the more nuanced, previous-trial-dependent congruency effect while maintaining 
the more basic incongruent-versus-congruent congruency effect. 
While the present study failed to link the ECT to implicit ER, future studies that rely on 
this task to study implicit ER in alexithymia should be aware of several potentially confounding 
effects that alexithymia may have on this task. First, past research has found that individuals with 
alexithymia experience difficulties identifying a range of facial expressions, including fear and 
enjoyment (Parker et al., 1993, as seen in Gilbert, 2009).  This could conceivably affect one’s 
ability to engage with the emotional faces used in the ECT, resulting in poor performance that is 
unrelated to actual implicit ER ability. Additionally, individuals high in alexithymia have 
demonstrated difficulty matching verbal descriptions to emotional images (Lane et al. 1996). In 
the context of the ECT, this may cause individuals higher in alexithymia to experience less 
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conflict between the emotional word and the emotional face during incongruent trials, which 
would decrease their need to engage in emotional control in the first place. 
In general, future research should continue exploring the interplay between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and alexithymia in the context of implicit ER while considering 
the limitations of the ECT mentioned above. A replication of this study with an intact response 
window may provide more informative results about the nature of this relationship. 
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Study 2 Introduction 
In Study 2, the relationship between ER and alexithymia in depression and anxiety was 
examined with regard to explicit, or effortful, ER. More specifically, Study 2 sought to determine 
whether or not conscious awareness of emotional processes was necessary to reap the benefits of 
an adaptive ER technique in which participants were explicitly instructed to engage: cognitive 
reappraisal. While Chen et al. (2011) found alexithymia to be associated with a reduced tendency 
to select adaptive ER techniques such as reappraisal, this study explored whether alexithymia 
affects one’s ability to put said techniques into practice when prompted. To explore this question 
further, explicit ER must first be understood.  
Explicit Emotion Regulation 
 As opposed to implicit ER – a process that occurs subconsciously – explicit ER involves 
the conscious and effortful modulation of one’s emotional state and, on a theoretical level, 
requires some level of awareness and insight to properly implement (Gyurak et al., 2011). 
However, whether this insight involves an understanding of the specific emotions at hand or 
simply an understanding that engagement in ER is necessary in a given moment remains to be 
seen.  
While the ability to modulate one’s emotions in an effortful manner is, like other forms of 
ER, an important day-to-day skill, explicit ER is especially important in learning-based treatment 
settings. In techniques such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), where therapy facilitates 
the learning of adaptive cognitive strategies and schemas, a patient’s ability to consciously 
engage in ER techniques is crucial for learning and overall therapeutic success. One form of 
CBT-inspired therapy in particular – Emotion Regulation Therapy, or ERT – focuses on 
instructing individuals with distress disorders such as GAD and MDD in the use of adaptive ER 
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techniques (Mennin, 2006), and is especially dependent on an individual’s ability to explicitly 
regulate their emotions. Similarly, Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) includes 
skills that directly target distress tolerance and ER. What’s more, as mentioned in Study 1, the 
boundary between the realms of implicit and explicit ER is porous: habitual use of an explicit ER 
strategy can render it implicit (Gyurak et al., 2011). This dynamic highlights the importance of 
explicit ER, as it suggests that one’s ability to engage in explicit techniques may affect the 
quality of one’s ultimate repertoire of automatic responses to emotion. 
Reappraisal 
There is a wide range of strategies that can be implemented, implicitly or explicitly, in 
the pursuit of regulating emotion. Research in ER has identified many such techniques, including 
cognitive reappraisal, distraction, labeling, suppression, and rumination. However, while their 
common goal may be to modulate emotion in some way, not all ER strategies lead to the same 
outcome. While certain strategies, such as suppression and rumination, have been found to be 
largely maladaptive and are implicated in various forms of psychopathology including 
depression and anxiety (Aldao et al., 2010), others have been associated with more successful 
reduction of negative affect. One ER technique that has been consistently identified as an 
adaptive method of regulation is cognitive reappraisal (Wolgast, Lundh, & Viborg, 2011). 
Cognitive reappraisal (reappraisal for short) refers to the generation of benign or positive 
interpretations of otherwise stressful situations (Gross, 1998b), and has been shown to reduce 
physiological signs of stress (Kim & Hamann, 2012; Yuan et al., 2015). Habitual use of 
reappraisal is related to greater positive affect, interpersonal functioning, and general wellbeing 
when compared to suppression (Gross & John, 2003). 
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It is important to note, however, that like most ER strategies, there is a contextual 
component to the success of reappraisal. For example, while reappraisal seems to be an adaptive 
ER strategy when dealing with uncontrollable stress (i.e., stress that stems from events outside of 
the individual’s control), cognitive reappraisal ability was found by Troy et al. (2013) to be 
paradoxically associated with greater levels of depression in individuals with controllable stress. 
This suggests that, at least in the context of controllable stressors, taking direct action to change 
the stressor may be more effective than using a less action-based cognitive technique to simply 
rethink the stressor. What’s more, its association with depression suggests that the use of 
reappraisal in this context may be a mechanism through which a sense of self-efficacy – a 
protective factor against depression (Maciejewski, Prigerson, & Mazure, 2000) – is undermined. 
In other words, if individuals with depression consistently use reappraisal as an alternative to 
more action-based problem solving techniques, it may contribute to a perceived lack of agency 
that may in turn maintain depressive symptoms. Overall, this study helps to qualify reappraisal’s 
status as an infallible ER technique – rather than being a universally adaptive regulatory strategy, 
reappraisal may be most useful in the face of situational stressors that are outside of one’s 
control.  
In addition to being moderated by situational factors, the success of reappraisal can 
depend on the population in question. For example, in a task where participants monitored by 
electroencephalogram (EEG) were instructed to engage in reappraisal prior to viewing a number 
of negative and neutral words and images, Han et al. (2014) found reappraisal instantaneously 
helped to reduce attentional bias towards negative words in healthy controls. However, this 
effect was not immediately seen in participants with GAD. Instead, the negative bias persisted in 
the early stages of perception before the eventual initiation of successful down-regulation. In 
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addition to the delayed onset of down-regulation, the effect of reappraisal differed between these 
populations by way of lateralization – down-regulation of negative emotion was found to be a 
left-lateralized process only in the case of individuals with GAD, where heightened left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity was observed during ER. These findings suggest that the 
act of reappraising may manifest itself differently in individuals with GAD than in healthy 
controls, with healthy controls being more able to reap the immediate benefits of reappraisal. For 
nonclinical symptoms of anxiety (i.e., state anxiety), however, reappraisal seems to be an 
effective technique. When asked to perform an impromptu speech, the implementation of 
reappraisal significantly reduced pre-speech anxiety when compared to other techniques such as 
suppression (Hofmann et al., 2009). 
Reappraisal also plays an important role in depression. According to Troy et al. (2010), at 
high levels of stress, successful engagement in cognitive reappraisal (indexed by changes in skin 
conductance and self-reported sadness in response to sad film clips) was associated with fewer 
depressive symptoms. This suggests that the ability to successfully implement cognitive 
reappraisal may be an important protective factor and mediator in the relationship between stress 
and depression. Despite these benefits, past research has consistently shown that reappraisal is 
more frequently used by healthy controls (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007), while individuals with 
depression are more likely to implement less adaptive ER techniques such as rumination and 
expressive suppression (D’Avanzato et al., 2013). While this dissociation manifests itself on a 
behavioral level, it may be rooted in neurobiology. According to Johnstone et al. (2007), who 
explicitly instructed individuals to engage in reappraisal during various tasks, healthy controls 
exhibited a negative, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)-mediated relationship between the 
left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) and the amygdala during regulation. However, an 
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entirely different phenomenon was seen in depressed individuals, where a positive linkage 
between vmPFC and amygdala activity was observed. Additionally, by overlaying pupil dilation 
and functional MRI data, Johnstone et al. (2007) found that individuals with depression who 
expended more effort during reappraisal exhibited heightened amygdala, insula, and thalamus 
activation. The opposite was true of healthy controls. These findings are evidence of underlying 
pathophysiology that interferes with the ability of individuals with depression to engage in 
cognitive reappraisal – a deficit the authors suggest stems from maladaptive engagement of the 
lateral PFC-VMPFC-amygdala inhibitory circuit during regulation.  
Physiological Profiles of Alexithymia 
It is important to note that the precise nature of the physiological profile of alexithymia 
remains a point of contention in the literature. Certain bodies of research on the physiology of 
alexithymia suggest that individuals with alexithymia tend to have decreased responsiveness to 
emotional stimuli. Wehmer et al. (1995), for example, found that higher alexithymia 
corresponded to a reduced increase in heart rate and lower electrodermal response to emotion-
provoking images, while Constantinou, Panayiotou, and Theodorou (2014) observed decreased 
autonomic reactivity in individuals with alexithymia as indexed by skin conductance and startle 
responses to emotional stimuli. Based on these studies, it is conceivable that a potential 
association with hyposensitivity may represent a physiological mechanism through which 
individuals with alexithymia exhibit decreased recognition for situations that require ER and 
subsequently fail to successfully regulate affect. If this were the case, and alexithymia was 
associated with a failure in ER recognition only, explicit instruction in ER may be particularly 
effective in the facilitation of successful regulation in alexithymia. 
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 Despite the evidence for a pattern of decreased reactivity in alexithymia, a hyper-arousal 
model of alexithymia has also emerged, with multiple studies citing increased arousal states in 
individuals high in alexithymia (e.g., Eastabrook, Lanteigne, & Hollenstein, 2013; Friedlander et 
al., 1997; Luminet et al., 2004). An important clarification to be made in Friedlander et al. 
(1997), however, is that while higher baseline physiological arousal was found to be associated 
with alexithymia, individuals with alexithymia exhibited reduced changes in heart rate in 
response to disgusting scenes, suggesting lower reactivity to emotion-eliciting stimuli. One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon could be an interaction between baseline arousal and 
reactivity – in other words, it could be that higher baseline arousal may increase the threshold at 
which stimuli elicit a response, thereby decreasing reactivity. However, while Stone and Nielson 
(2001) also found an increased baseline level of arousal in individuals with high alexithymia in 
response to emotion-eliciting videos, all participants, regardless of alexithymia levels, showed an 
increase in physiological arousal in response to negative stimuli. Interestingly, although their 
physiological reactivity was comparable to their less-alexithymic counterparts, individuals high 
in alexithymia failed to report any change in subjective emotional intensity. This suggests that 
alexithymia may be associated with some level of decoupling between physiological arousal and 
subjective experience of emotion – a phenomenon that the authors posit may put individuals with 
alexithymia at risk for stress disorders. The presence of a decoupling between subjective 
emotional experience and physiological response to emotion in alexithymia has been more 
recently validated (Peasley-Miklus, Panayiotou, & Vrana, 2016), and serves as further evidence 
for alexithymia’s proposed detrimental effect on ER: individuals who fail to recognize 
physiological changes in response to emotion may miss crucial bodily cues to engage in ER in a 
given moment. Keeping the bidimensional aspect of alexithymia in mind, the presence of this 
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decoupling may be reflective of individuals affected solely by the cognitive deficits of 
alexithymia, whose physiology reflects the presence of an emotional response but who have 
difficulty identifying or describing it on a subjective level.  
Overall, these physiological findings suggest that alexithymia may be best characterized 
by some combination of the hypo- and hyper-arousal theories. Namely, alexithymia may be 
associated with higher baseline arousal, but less reactivity (or less awareness/identification of 
emotions, depending on the type of alexithymia in question) in the face of emotion-inducing 
stimuli. Bermond et al. (2010) help to clarify this point of contention by arguing that past studies 
fail to break apart alexithymia into its cognitive and affective components. Their findings suggest 
that the two dimensions of alexithymia affect different aspects of physiological response, with 
the affective component influencing galvanic skin response (GSR) peak amplitude while the 
cognitive component influences baseline GSR values. Further research suggests that these 
dimensions and their effects on physiology may be split along clinical/nonclinical lines. For 
example, Herbert, Herbert, and Pollatos (2011) found that within nonclinical samples, 
individuals with alexithymia demonstrate reduced interoceptive awareness and physiological 
reactivity that may reflect attenuated emotional experience. In MDD, however, alexithymia has 
been associated with heightened physiological arousal that may correspond to displacement 
behavior, or a compensatory reaction to difficulties in the cognitive regulation of emotions 
(Troisi et al., 2000). In this circumstance, it could be that nonclinical samples exhibit cognitive 
and affective deficits associated with alexithymia and therefore have diminished physiological 
reactivity and a subsequent reduced need for ER. By contrast, individuals with MDD may exhibit 
high capacities for experiencing affect but reduced cognitive functioning as a result of 
alexithymia, resulting in a positive feedback loop of intensified and unregulated negative 
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emotions (van der Velde et al., 2013).3 This explanation helps to reconcile the contrasting 
physiological evidence regarding alexithymia while also providing support for a potential 
alexithymia-mediated model of emotion dysregulation in psychopathology consistent with 
mediation model B (see Figure 1B).   
Heart Rate Variability 
Heart rate variability (HRV) refers to beat-to-beat variation in heart rate, and was first 
implemented in a clinical setting by Hon and Lee (1963), who noticed that distress in fetuses was 
preceded by alterations in the interval between heartbeats. Since then, HRV has come to be 
known as a non-invasive measure of autonomic nervous system activation invaluable to clinical 
research (Malik et al., 1996).  
The heart is innervated by multiple sources. The parasympathetic nervous system (PNS), 
or the “rest and digest” system, affects heart rate via the vagus nerve, which releases 
acetylcholine that acts on the sino-atrial and atrio-ventricular nodes, resulting in decreased heart 
rate (Karim, Ali, & Hasan, 2011; Malik et al., 1996). The sympathetic nervous system (SNS), or 
the “fight or flight” system, influences heart rate through the release of epinephrine and 
norepinephrine, acting on the same nodes as the PNS and causing increased heart rate (Karim et 
al., 2011). HRV has been speculated to measure the ratio of the sympathetic versus the 
parasympathetic influence on heart rate, and is an indicator of the body’s ability to regulate and 
respond adaptively to stress. In the context of this study, however, HRV data were analyzed with 
regards to parasympathetic influence only. This was done through the use of the high frequency 
component (HF): a frequency band of oscillations that corresponds, in normal subjects and under 
controlled conditions, to respiratory arrhythmia (Lombardi, 2002).  
DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, ALEXITHYMIA IN ER                                                           46 
	
Although somewhat counterintuitive at first glance, higher HRV is more adaptive as it is 
an indicator of heightened flexibility in the face of environmental stressors (Dishman et al., 
2000). For example, if an individual with well-developed regulation abilities becomes stressed, 
their heart rate will undergo an initial increase followed by a rapid return to baseline as they 
engage in regulatory processes. This process would be reflected in high HRV in this individual. 
In keeping with this notion, research has shown HRV to have an inverse relationship with 
perceived stress, such that individuals who perceive more stress have lower HRV (Dishman et 
al., 2000). Furthermore, the HF component of HRV has been shown to decrease under conditions 
of emotional strain and time pressure (Nickel & Nachreiner, 2003) as well as in anxiety-inducing 
situations (Jönsson, 2007) within the general population. 
In terms of its relationship with psychopathology, low HRV is common in anxiety 
disorders (including GAD, panic disorder, and social phobia; Licht et al., 2009) and un-
medicated depression with and without comorbid anxiety (Kemp et al., 2012). It is important to 
note, however, that the observed relationship between HRV and anxiety disorders may be 
mediated by medication – when controlling for the use of tricyclics, selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs), or other antidepressants, the relationship between HRV and anxiety disorders 
was reduced to the point of non-significance in one study (Licht et al., 2009). This finding calls 
into question whether HRV is related to the features of anxiety disorders themselves or simply 
the treatment associated with such disorders. In spite of this, Kemp et al. (2012) found 
depression with comorbid anxiety to have a stronger inverse relationship with HRV than 
depression alone, even in un-medicated populations. This finding suggests that comorbid anxiety 
may have a different physiological profile than anxiety alone.  
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In the context of this study, HRV acted as a measure of one’s ability to engage in 
explicitly instructed reappraisal by indexing the changes in PNS activation over the course of the 
experimental protocol via the HF component. Past research on ER and HRV has shown that 
individuals with greater regulatory abilities have higher baseline HRV (Appelhans & Luecken, 
2006). What’s more, according to Butler, Wilhelm, and Gross (2006) successful engagement in 
ER appears to increase HRV. In conjunction with the aforementioned negative relationship 
between HF and emotional strain (Nickel & Nachreiner, 2003), these findings informed the use 
of the HF component of HRV to operationalize participants’ ER ability, with higher HF acting as 
an index of more successful ER and lower HF indicating less successful ER. 
Hypotheses 
While Johnstone et al. (2007) demonstrate the causes of reappraisal’s failure on a 
neurobiological level, it remains unclear what psychological factors may influence an 
individual’s ability to engage in reappraisal. Furthermore, past studies have associated the ability 
to engage in reappraisal with fewer depressive symptoms (Troy et al., 2010) and found 
reappraisal use to be more prevalent in healthy controls than individuals with depression or 
anxiety (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007). Although these studies point to the difficulty of successful 
cognitive reappraisal in depression and anxiety, none broach the question of why these 
differences are seen. 
As previously mentioned, Subic-Wrana et al. (2014) assessed participants’ levels of 
emotional awareness and ER preferences and found emotional awareness to be positively 
correlated with reappraisal use. As the scale assessing emotional awareness (adapted from the 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale, or LEAS; Lane et al., 1990) ranged from implicit, or 
subconscious, to explicit, or conscious, emotional awareness, this means that participants with 
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explicit emotional awareness were more likely to implement reappraisal. As such, Subic-Wrana 
et al. (2014) provide preliminary evidence for a model of emotion dysregulation that implicates a 
lack of explicit emotional awareness as a barrier to successful engagement in reappraisal. Indeed, 
it is conceivable that reappraisal requires some level of understanding of the emotion being 
experienced in order to fully conceptualize A) in what way the situation at hand is producing 
negative affect and/or B) how to reframe the situation in a way that will change or improve one’s 
mood state. In this way, alexithymia could be said to mediate the relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and ER ability consistent with Model B (Figure 1B). This is 
further supported by Chen et al. (2011), who established that the presence of alexithymia 
decreases one’s likelihood to implement reappraisal. Based on these findings and in accordance 
with Model B, I predicted that alexithymia would mediate a negative relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and explicit ER ability, indexed here by changes in HRV 
following stress induction and subsequent explicitly instructed cognitive reappraisal. In other 
words, I predicted that the proposed relationship between symptom severity and explicit ER 
ability would be attenuated when alexithymia was included as a predictor of explicit ER ability.  
As it was performed in the context of explicit ER – in this case via instructions to engage 
in reappraisal – this study also sought to elucidate whether the association between alexithymia 
and ER failure that has been seen in past studies4 was due to individuals with alexithymia 
missing the cue to initiate regulation or lacking the ability to successfully regulate even when 
prompted to do so. In this case, the predicted mediating role of alexithymia in a negative 
relationship with ER corresponds to the latter, while a lack of association between alexithymia 
and emotion dysregulation may be indicative of the former.  
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Study 2 Method 
Participants 
Participants were 62 Bates College students (28 men, 33 women, 1 agender) recruited via 
an email announce system, Facebook events, or a Bates introductory psychology course, 12 of 
whom also participated in Study 1. Standardized consent forms were made available before the 
study. Participants received either course credit or $5 as compensation. Additionally, all 
participants were entered in a raffle for one of three $10 gift cards to an on-campus restaurant. 
All participants were at least 18 years of age (with the exception of one 17-year-old who 
continued with the study despite being informed of the study requirements) and were 
comfortable reading directions and questions in English. The sample was 17.7% Black, 69.4% 
White, and 19.4% Asian. 9.7% of the sample identified as Hispanic or Latina/Latino. 
Materials 
 As in Study 1, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994a), the Center 
for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), and the 7-item Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder scale (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006) were used. For complete descriptions of 
these scales, see the Materials section of Study 1. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Crawford & Henry, 2004). The 
PANAS is a self-report questionnaire that consists of two 10-item subscales – one for the 
measurement of positive affect, and one for the measurement of negative affect. For both 
subscales, higher scores correspond to higher levels of corresponding affect. The PANAS lists a 
series of emotion words, such as “Interested” and “Determined” in the case of positive affect, 
and “Upset” and “Scared” in the case of negative affect. While reading the emotion words, 
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participants use a scale with 5 response categories (1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = 
extremely) to indicate the extent to which they feel that way in the present moment.  
Emotion Regulation Task (ERT; adapted from White & Soto, 2017). In this study, 
participants performed a modified emotion regulation task (ERT) adapted from White and Soto 
(2017). In the adapted ERT, a subjective and physiological baseline5 (B1) was established in 
which participants responded to the PANAS before sitting still for 2 minutes while their heart 
rate was recorded using an electrocardiogram (EKG). The EKG continued to record participants’ 
heart rates for the remainder of the protocol. Next, participants performed an emotionally neutral 
writing task in which they were instructed to describe a nearby glass bowl by typing about it for 
three minutes (CW).  
The investigator then informed participants that they would soon be performing a spur-
of-the-moment speech that would last for 2 minutes. Participants were told that this speech 
would be filmed and that the investigator would be evaluating their performance based on 
persuasiveness. A second subjective and physiological baseline was established after the 
presentation of this information (B2). Next, participants were presented with a prompt that 
instructed them to engage in a reappraisal writing task (R; “Write about all of the positive aspects 
of giving this speech, including what you may learn and how you may grow through the 
experience”; White and Soto, 2017). After writing for 3 minutes, the participants provided a third 
subjective and physiological baseline (B3).  
Finally, participants received the topic of the speech (“Should the death penalty be a legal 
form of punishment for severe crimes?”; White & Soto, 2017) and performed a speech for 2 
minutes in front of the investigator and a device that was set up to appear to be filming (S). The 
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participants then provided a final subjective and physiological baseline (B4). Figure 3 includes a 
diagram of the overall procedure. 
PowerLab 4/25T Electrocardiogram and LabChart 8© (ADInstruments, 2016). The 
electrocardiogram used in this study was a PowerLab 4/25T device used to collect physiological 
data by means of an eight-channel polygraph and a microcomputer. The data extracted from this 
device were analyzed and cleaned using LabChart 8© software (ADInstruments, 2016). Data 
were analyzed to examine HRV, which acted as a measure of parasympathetic nervous system 
(PNS) arousal (Katona & Jih, 1975) with high HRV indexing high levels of PNS arousal. This 
was done through the use of the high frequency component, or HF – a frequency band of 
oscillations that corresponds, in normal subjects and under controlled conditions, to respiratory 
arrhythmia (Lombardi, 2002). In the context of this study, lower HF represented less successful 
ER, while higher HF represented more successful ER. 
Procedure 
After reviewing and signing an informed consent form with the researcher, participants 
responded to a number of questionnaires, including the CES-D, the GAD-7, and the TAS-20. All 
self-report measures and subsequent experimental stimuli were integrated into an online survey 
created using Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics, 2015). 
After responding to the initial questionnaires, the participants were acquainted with the 
EKG as a noninvasive device that causes no significant discomfort and is used to measure heart 
rate variability (HRV). They were then instructed to remove any jewelry. Next, the participants 
were asked if they are comfortable having electrodes placed on their lower ribcage and clavicle 
by the investigator. If so, the investigator adhered three pre-gelled electrodes to the right clavicle 
at the midclavicular line, on the last bone of the ribcage at the left midaxillary line and on the last 
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bone of the ribcage at the right midaxillary line, swabbing each area with alcohol beforehand. If 
the participant was uncomfortable with this procedure, the investigator clearly instructed the 
participant on how to adhere the electrodes, and, if participant comfort allowed, checked to make 
sure they were properly positioned. Once the electrodes were attached and the EKG was 
recording, participants performed the ERT (see Figure 3). 
Finally, before receiving a debriefing form and reimbursement, participants responded to 
a demographics questionnaire. Like in Study 1, all participants, regardless of symptom 
endorsement, were provided with a list of mental health resources. 
Study 2 Results 
It is important to note that the term “HRV” in the following sections is synonymous with 
high frequency component, or HF, measured in units of microseconds squared (µs2). In the 
context of this study, lower HF values represented less successful ER, while higher HF values 
represented more successful ER. 
Screening 
 The SPSS outlier analysis function was used to identify and remove outliers from the raw 
HRV data. Only outliers classified as "extreme values" were removed, with the program using a 
formula of 1.5x interquartile range to identify these problematic data points. 
 In order to assess the level of engagement with the reappraisal task, all responses to the 
reappraisal writing prompt were carefully examined to determine whether or not the participant 
followed the instructions of the task (i.e., “Write about all of the positive aspects of giving this 
speech, including what you may learn and how you may grow through the experience”). 
Appropriate responses showed that the participant had read the prompt and followed instructions, 
and were classified as responses that listed at least one positive aspect associated with giving the 
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speech. Examples of appropriate responses seen in the data include “[The speech] will allow me 
to learn how to think on my feet” and “I can learn how to improvise more effectively and 
efficiently”. An example of an inappropriate response was “I don’t think I will grow much 
because of this speech”. Responses that did not list any positive aspects associated with giving 
the speech were noted (n = 1). However, due to the low number of inappropriate responses, and 
the fact that an inability to follow reappraisal instructions could be considered an index of ER 
difficulty, the participant associated with this response was not removed from further analysis. 
This exercise showed, however, that all participants at least read the prompt and that all but one 
participant successfully followed the prompt’s instructions. 
Variables of Interest 
To assess the success of the reappraisal exercise, the change in HRV between the post-
speech-instruction baseline (B2) and the post-regulation baseline (B3) was examined (B3 - B2). 
The change in HRV between B2 and the final baseline of the protocol (B4) was also examined as 
an index of the longer-lasting effects of reappraisal (B4 - B2). For both change scores (B3 - B2 
and B4 - B2), larger positive values corresponded to a decreased stress response and more 
successful engagement in reappraisal. 
Manipulation Checks 
In order to characterize the overall changes in HRV and subjectively reported affect over 
the course of the four baselines, three sets of paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare 
both mean HRV and mean subjectively reported affect at these time points. A Bonferroni 
correction was applied to account for Type I error associated with multiple comparisons, 
resulting in an alpha-level of .017 for the following paired samples t-tests. 
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Consistent with the goal of the stress induction protocol, participants displayed 
significantly lower mean HRV (as indexed by a lower HF value) at B2 (post stress induction; M 
= 1330.81µs2, SD = 1256.85 µs2) than at B1 (pre stress induction; M = 1984.60 µs2, SD = 
2161.23 µs2) as revealed by a paired samples t-test contrasting the mean HF value of B1 with the 
mean HF value of B2, t(59) = 3.32, p = .002. This suggests that participants became significantly 
more stressed after learning that they would soon be performing a speech. This finding was 
supported by paired samples t-test that contrasted subjectively reported affect at B1 with 
subjectively reported affect at B2, where negative affect was significantly higher at B2 (M = 
16.66, SD = 5.56) than at B1 (M = 13.39, SD = 3.77), t(60) = -5.97, p < .001, and positive affect 
was marginally significantly lower at B2 (M = 27.03, SD = 8.25) than at B1 (M = 28.80, SD = 
7.82), t(60) = 2.38, p = .020. 
 Surprisingly, mean HRV at B3 (post reappraisal; M = 1091.32 µs2, SD = 900.40 µs2) was 
significantly lower than mean HRV at B2 (post stress induction; M = 1330.81µs2, SD = 1256.85 
µs2) as shown by a paired samples t-test, t(58) = 2.53, p = .014. This suggests that rather than 
reducing stress, the reappraisal task was associated with a persisting stress response. This 
finding, however, was not supported by subjectively reported affect, as shown by paired samples 
t-tests that revealed a significant difference in neither negative affect at B2 (M = 16.73, SD = 
5.57) versus B3 (M = 16.25, SD = 6.24), t(59) = 1.26, p = .214, nor positive affect at B2 (M = 
27.03, SD = 8.25) versus B3 (M = 26.33, SD = 9.00, t(60) = 1.62, p = .111. 
 Finally, a paired samples t-test comparing mean HRV at B3 (post reappraisal; M = 
1091.32 µs2, SD = 900.40 µs2) with mean HRV at B4 (post speech; M = 1082.82 µs2, SD = 
893.77 µs2) revealed no significant difference between these two points, suggesting that 
participants were equally stressed immediately following reappraisal as they were after 
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completing the speech. This finding was congruent with subjective data, as shown by paired 
samples t-tests that revealed a significant difference in neither negative affect at B3 (M = 16.21, 
SD = 6.19) versus B4 (M = 16.11, SD = 6.39), t(60) = 0.17 , p = .870, nor positive affect at B3 
(M = 26.29, SD = 9.00) versus B4 (M = 25.25, SD = 9.06, t(60) = 1.84, p = .071. 
These analyses provided an understanding of a typical response to the experimental 
protocol, demonstrating how HRV and subjectively reported affect fluctuated and interacted over 
the course of the experiment. For a graphical representation of overall changes in HRV and in 
subjectively reported affect over time, see Figures 4 and 5, respectively. 
Depression, Anxiety, and Alexithymia 
All scales demonstrated acceptable levels of internal consistency. Cronbach’s alphas for 
the CES-D and the GAD-7 were .80 and .85, respectively. Cronbach’s alpha for the TAS-20 as a 
whole was .82. The DIF, DDF, and EOT subscales contained 7, 5, and 8 items and had 
Cronbach’s alphas of .83, .76, and .65, respectively. In the present study, the PANAS was used at 
four time points. At the first time point, Cronbach’s alphas for positive and negative affect were 
.87 and .78, respectively. At the second time point, Cronbach’s alphas for positive and negative 
affect were .91 and .86, respectively. At the third time point, Cronbach’s alphas for positive and 
negative affect were .92 and .88, respectively. Finally, at the fourth time point, Cronbach’s 
alphas for positive and negative affect were .92 and .87, respectively. 
 Correlations. In the pursuit of a preliminary understanding of the relationships between 
the IVs (total score on the CES-D, the GAD-7, and the TAS-20) and the DVs of interest, a 
number of bivariate correlation analyses were performed. These and all following analyses use 
an alpha-level of .05 unless otherwise specified. The full results of these correlation analyses can 
be found in Table 2.  
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To assess the relationships between participants’ scores on depression (M = 13.84, SD = 
6.20), anxiety (M = 5.36, SD = 3.97), and alexithymia (M = 42.29, SD = 9.86) scales – the CES-
D, GAD-7, and TAS-20, respectively – bivariate correlation analyses were run between these 
variables. As in Study 1, these variables were highly positively correlated. Total score on the 
CES-D was significantly correlated with total score on the GAD-7, r(60) = .63, p < .001, as well 
as total score on the TAS-20, r(60) = .61,  p < .001. GAD-7 and TAS-20 scores were also 
significantly correlated with one another, r(60) = .41, p = .001.  
Bivariate correlation analyses were also performed to explore the relationships between 
depression, anxiety, alexithymia and subjective/physiological distress during the task. For 
clarity’s sake, variables with no significant relationship to any of the IVs were excluded from 
Table 2. Of particular note, total score on the CES-D was significantly correlated with HRV 
during the speech (S), r(55) = -.30, p = .024, as well as during the control writing task (CW), 
r(56) = -.30, p = .022. Similarly, total score on the GAD-7 was significantly correlated with 
HRV during CW, r(56) = -.27, p = .042. In all cases, increased depression/anxiety corresponded 
to decreased HRV at these time points. 
 In the context of subjectively reported affect, total score on the CES-D was significantly 
correlated with subjectively reported negative affect at the first baseline (B1) and final baseline 
(B4), where higher depression corresponded with higher levels of negative affect at both B1, 
r(60) = .31,  p = .016, and B4, r(60) = .33,  p = .008. Total score on the GAD-7 was also 
significantly correlated with subjectively reported negative affect at these time points, where 
higher anxiety corresponded with higher levels of negative affect at B1, r(60) = .41,  p = .001 
and B4, r(60) = .44,  p < .001. No such phenomenon was seen in the context of the TAS-20. 
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Contrary to predictions, bivariate correlation analyses did not find total scores on the 
CES-D, GAD-7, and TAS-20 to be significantly correlated with HRV change scores indexing 
relative success of reappraisal (B3 - B2, B4 - B2). However, when these change scores were 
calculated using subjectively reported negative affect instead of HRV, total score on the GAD-7 
was found to be significantly correlated with B4 - B2, r(59) = .39,  p = .002, suggesting some 
level of decoupling between perceived stress and physiological arousal in the context of anxiety. 
Regression analyses.  
Mediation analyses. In order to explore the proposed mediation models (see Figure 1) in 
the context of explicit ER, a number of simple linear regressions were conducted using both 
HRV and subjectively reported affect. 
HRV. In the following analyses, the HRV change score B3 - B2 was used as the DV to 
index the immediate physiological effects of reappraisal, with larger values of this variable 
corresponding to a decreased stress response and more successful regulation. 
First, to explore Model A (see Figure 1A), a simple linear regression was calculated to 
predict B3 - B2 based on total score on the TAS-20, yielding a marginally significant regression 
equation, R2 = .03, F(1, 57) = 2.95, p = .091, where, surprisingly, higher total score on the TAS-
20 predicted a larger B3 - B2 change score, β = 15.83, t(56) = 1.72, p = .091. In other words, 
alexithymia predicted a better reappraisal outcome. In order to determine whether this trend, 
though not very robust, would be reflected elsewhere in this model, the mediation analysis 
continued with further simple linear regressions that were calculated to predict total scores on the 
CES-D and the GAD-7 based on total score on the TAS-20. Both analyses yielded significant 
regression equations, R2 = .36, F(1, 60) = 35.47, p < .001 with total score of the CES-D as the 
DV; R2 = .41, F(1, 60) = 12.10 , p = .001 with total score of the GAD-7 as the DV. Higher total 
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score on the TAS-20 predicted higher total scores on both the CES-D, β = 0.38, t(59) = 5.96, p < 
.001, and the GAD-7, β = .17, t(59) = 3.48, p = .001. Finally, simple linear regressions were 
calculated to predict B3 - B2 based on total scores on the CES-D and the GAD-7. A significant 
regression equation was yielded in neither the context of the CES-D, R2 = -.01, F(1, 57) = 0.28, p 
= .602, nor the context of the GAD-7, R2 = .00, F(1, 57) = 1.00, p = .320, and no further 
meditation analyses were performed. 
These latter two simple linear regressions also failed to support mediation model B (see 
Figure 1B), as they established no significant relationship between total scores on the CES-
D/GAD-7 and B3 - B2 change values. As such, no further meditation analyses were performed. 
Subjectively reported affect. In the following analyses, the subjective change score 
PANAS3 – PANAS2 was used as the DV to index the immediate subjective effects of 
reappraisal, with larger values of this variable corresponding to a decreased stress response and 
more successful regulation in the case of positive affect and an increased stress response and less 
successful regulation in the case of negative affect. 
First, to explore Model A (see Figure 1A) in the context of subjectively reported affect, 
two simple linear regressions were calculated to predict positive and negative affect, 
respectively, based on total score on the TAS-20. A significant regression equation was yielded 
in neither the context of positive affect, R2 = .03, F(1, 59) = 2.04,  p = .158, nor the context of 
negative affect, R2 = .00, F(1, 58) = 2.07,  p = .651, and no further mediation analyses were 
performed in this context. 
To explore Model B (see Figure 1B), two simple linear regressions were calculated to 
predict positive and negative affect, respectively, based on total score on the GAD-7. A 
significant regression equation was yielded in neither the context of positive affect, R2 = .00, F(1, 
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59) = 0.20,  p = .659, nor the context of negative affect, R2 = .01, F(1, 58) = 0.54,  p = .466, and 
no further mediation analyses were performed in this context. Finally, two simple linear 
regressions were calculated to predict positive and negative affect, respectively, based on total 
score on the CES-D. A significant regression equation was yielded in neither the context of 
positive affect, R2 = .04, F(1, 59) = 2.39,  p = .127, nor the context of negative affect, R2 = 
.02, F(1, 58) = 0.95,  p = .335, and no further mediation analyses were performed in this context. 
Task-specific analyses. Finally, simple linear regressions were calculated in an attempt to 
better characterize certain relationships that were established by correlation analysis (namely 
correlations between HRV [S] and CES-D scores, as well as HRV [CW] and both CES-D and 
GAD-7 scores; see Table 2).  
First, a simple linear regression was calculated to predict HRV during the speech based 
on total score on the CES-D. In line with the correlational relationship that inspired it, this 
analysis established total score on the CES-D to be a predictor of HRV during the speech, 
yielding a significant regression equation, R2 = .07, F(1, 56) = 5.37, p = .024, where higher score 
on the CES-D predicted lower HRV during the speech, β = -24.71, t(54) = -2.32, p = .024. 
Simple linear regressions were also calculated to predict HRV during the control writing task 
based on total score on both the CES-D, R2 = .07, F(1, 56) = 5.54, p = .022, and the GAD-7, R2 = 
.06, F(1, 57) = 4.33, p = .042. In both cases, higher total scores significantly predicted lower 
HRV during this task, β = -34.00, t(54) = -2.35, p = .022 in the case of the CES-D; β = -
51.14, t(55) = -2.08, p = .042 in the case of GAD-7 
Categorical Analyses. In order to investigate the effects of depressive/anxious symptoms 
and alexithymia on subjective and physiological emotional response over time, these constructs 
were examined on a categorical basis, with depression and anxiety being categorized based on 
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their recommended diagnostic cut-off points of 16 and 10, respectively (Radloff, 1977; Kroenke 
et al., 2007). Due to the fact that only 2 participants were above the TAS-20’s recommended cut-
off point for high alexithymia (61; Bagby et al., 1994a), alexithymia was categorized by dividing 
the sample into groups representative of “low” and “high” alexithymia after using median split 
techniques to establish a cut-off point of 42. Based on these methods of categorization, 20 of the 
62 total participants were above the cutoff point for depression, 10 for anxiety, and 7 for both 
depression and anxiety. The groups representing low (corresponding to TAS-20 scores between 
0 and 41) and high (corresponding to TAS-20 scores of 42 and above) alexithymia both 
contained 31 participants. With the largely subclinical nature of the sample in mind, it is 
important to temper the results outlined below with the knowledge that the power of these 
analyses was limited due to the small number of people above diagnostic cutoff points, 
especially in the context of the GAD-7. 
Heart rate variability over time. Three one-way repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted to compare the effects of categorical depression, anxiety, and alexithymia, 
respectively, on HRV across all time points of the experimental protocol. In all cases, HRV was 
examined across seven time points – B1, CW, B2, R, B3, S, and B4 – in order to examine 
physiological distress associated with the experimental protocol. 
CES-D. First, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with CES-D group (high 
depression [n = 18] vs. low depression [n = 33]) as the between-subjects variable (IV) and HRV 
as the DV. Time (i.e., all seven time points) was included as the repeated-measures within-
subject variable. The results of this analysis and subsequent analyses using HRV as the DV are 
presented in Table 3. As Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated (χ2(20) = 202.05, p < .001), degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
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Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.38). While this analysis revealed a significant within-
subjects effect of time, F(2.25, 110.44) = 14.10, p < .001, neither a between-subjects effect of 
CES-D group membership on HRV nor a CES-D x Time interaction were found. 
GAD-7. A second one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with GAD-7 group (high 
anxiety [n = 8] vs. low anxiety [n = 43]) as the between-subjects IV and HRV as the DV. As 
before, time was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. As Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(20) = 200.55, p < .001), degrees 
of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.38). Similar 
to the previous analysis, while this analysis revealed a significant within-subjects effect of time, 
F(2.44, 111.26) = 5.72, p = .003, neither a between-subjects effect of GAD-7 group membership 
on HRV nor a GAD-7 x Time interaction were found. 
TAS-20. Finally, a third one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with TAS-20 
group (high alexithymia [n = 25] vs. low alexithymia [n = 26]) as the between-subjects IV and 
HRV as the DV. Time was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. As 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(20) = 205.73, p 
< .001), degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε 
= 0.37). Similar to the previous two analyses, while this analysis revealed a significant within-
subjects effect of time, F(2.23, 109.41) = 14.91, p < .001, neither a between-subjects effect of 
TAS-20 group membership on HRV nor a TAS-20 x Time interaction were found. 
Subjectively reported affect over time. Three sets of one-way repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted to compare the effects of categorical depression, anxiety, and 
alexithymia, respectively, on subjectively reported affect across all baseline time points. In all 
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cases, subjectively reported affect was examined across four baseline time points – B1, B2, B3, 
and B4 – in order to examine subjective distress associated with the experimental protocol. 
CES-D. First, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with CES-D group (high 
depression [n = 20] vs. low depression [n = 40]) as the IV and subjective negative affect as the 
DV. Time (i.e., all four baseline time points) was included as the repeated-measures within-
subject variable. The results of this analysis and subsequent analyses using subjective negative 
affect as the DV are presented in Table 4. As Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 19.68, p = .001), degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.85). This analysis revealed a significant 
within-subjects effect of time, F(2.55, 147.80) = 14.04, p < .001. A marginally significant main 
effect of CES-D group membership on negative affect was also found, F(2.55, 147.80) = 
3.44, p = .069, indicating that members of the high depression group tended to report higher 
levels of negative affect (M = 17.28, SE = 0.76) than did members of the low depression group 
(M = 14.84, SE = 1.08) across time. No CES-D x Time interaction was found.  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was also run with CES-D group (high depression 
[n = 18] vs. low depression [n = 42]) as the IV and subjective positive affect as the DV. As 
before, time was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. The results of this 
analysis and subsequent analyses using subjective positive affect as the DV are presented in 
Table 5. As Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 
61.51, p < .001), degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = 0.63). This analysis revealed a significant within-subjects effect of time, F(1.90, 
110.22) = 3.60, p = .033. Although analysis revealed no between-subjects effect of CES-D group 
membership on positive affect, a significant CES-D x Time interaction was found, F(1.90, 
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110.22) = 3.69, p = .030. To further characterize this interaction effect, simple effects were 
examined using a number of independent samples t-tests that compared positive affect of 
members of the high depression group to positive affect of members of the low depression group 
at B1, B2, B3, and B4. These analyses revealed a marginally significant simple effect of 
depression group membership on subjectively reported positive affect at B1 only. Namely, 
positive affect at B1 was reported to be marginally significantly lower by members of the high 
depression group (M = 26.10, SD = 7.55) than by members of the low depression group (M = 
30.19, SD = 7.62), t(60) = -1.98, p = .052. This effect was not seen at any other time point. For a 
visual representation of this effect, see Figure 6. 
GAD-7. Next, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with GAD-7 group (high 
anxiety [n = 10] vs. low anxiety [n = 50]) as the IV and subjective negative affect as the DV. 
Time was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. As Mauchly’s test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 19.96, p = .001), degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.85). As seen in Table 4, 
this analysis revealed a significant within-subjects effect of time, F(2.27, 111.26) = 5.72, p = 
.003, as well as a significant between-subjects effect of GAD-7 group membership on negative 
affect, F(1, 58) = 8.56, p = .004, indicating that members of the high anxiety group tended to 
report higher levels of negative affect (M = 19.63 SE = 1.46) than did members of the low 
anxiety group (M = 14.86, SE = 0.65) across time. A significant GAD-7 x Time interaction was 
also found F(2.54, 147.57) = 3.02, p = .040. To further characterize this interaction effect, simple 
effects were computed using a number of independent samples t-tests that compared negative 
affect of members of the high anxiety group to negative affect of members of the low anxiety 
group at B1, B2, B3, and B4. These analyses revealed a significant simple effect of anxiety 
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group membership on subjectively reported negative affect at B1 and B4 only. At B1, negative 
affect was reported to be significantly higher by members of the high anxiety group (M = 17.10, 
SD = 5.95) than by members of the low anxiety group (M = 12.69, SD = 2.70), t(60) = -2.30, p = 
.045. A similar phenomenon was seen at B4, where negative affect was reported to be 
significantly higher by the high anxiety group (M = 22.30, SD = 8.55) than by the low anxiety 
group (M = 14.83, SD = 5.15), t(60) = -2.67, p = .023. This effect was not seen at any other time 
point. For a visual representation of these effects, see Figure 7. 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was also run with GAD-7 group (high anxiety [n 
= 9] vs. low anxiety [n = 51]) as the IV and subjective positive affect as the DV. As before, time 
was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. As Mauchly’s test indicated that 
the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 65.95, p < .001), degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.62). As seen in Table 5, 
this analysis revealed no significant effects other than a marginally significant within-subjects 
effect of time, F(1.84, 106.95) = 2.88, p = .065. 
TAS-20. Finally, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with TAS-20 group 
(high alexithymia [n = 31] vs. low alexithymia [n = 29]) as the IV and subjective negative affect 
as the DV. Time was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. As Mauchly’s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 19.62, p = .001), 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.85). 
As seen in Table 4, this analysis revealed no significant effects other than a significant within-
subjects effect of time, F(2.56, 148.54) = 14.02, p < .001. 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was also run with TAS-20 group (high 
alexithymia [n = 31] vs. low alexithymia [n = 29]) as the IV and subjective positive affect as the 
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DV. As before, time was included as the repeated-measures within-subject variable. As 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 65.74, p > 
.001), degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 
0.62). As seen in Table 5, this analysis revealed no significant effects other than a significant 
within-subjects effect of time, F(1.85, 107.12) = 7.54, p = .001. 
Study 2 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of the relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms, alexithymia, and explicit ER ability through two mediation 
models. More specifically, this study aimed to build a more complete understanding of how 
depressive/anxious symptoms and alexithymia affected one’s ability to benefit from explicit 
instructions to engage in reappraisal.  
While total scores on the CES-D, GAD-7, and TAS-20 were highly correlated with and 
predictive of one another, demonstrating the expected association between these three constructs, 
these relationships were consistent with neither proposed model (A or B). This was largely due 
to a lack of association between these variables and physiological change scores B3 - B2 and B4 
- B2. The meaning of these change scores, however, were difficult to interpret due to an 
unexpected persisting stress response following reappraisal. It is important to note that 
alexithymia was, surprisingly, marginally associated with a more positive (or at least less 
negative) reappraisal outcome.  
In order to explore the relationships between variables of interest outside of the context of 
change scores, categorical analyses were also conducted. While these analyses revealed no 
significant effects of group membership on HRV over time, several main and interaction effects 
of group membership on subjective affect were seen. These effects included a tendency for 
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individuals high in depression to report higher negative affect across time and lower positive 
affect particularly at B1, as well as a tendency for individuals high in anxiety to report higher 
negative affect across time, particularly at B1 and B4. These findings were supported by positive 
correlations between scores on the CES-D and GAD-7 and subjectively reported negative effect 
at B1 and B4. No such finding was seen in the context of alexithymia. 
Reappraisal 
The marked failure of reappraisal was perhaps the most striking finding in the context of 
the greater experimental design of this study – not only did explicitly-instructed reappraisal fail 
to increase HRV when comparing B3 (post-reappraisal) to B2 (post-stress induction), it 
paradoxically corresponded to a further drop in HRV. This failure was widespread, manifesting 
itself on some level across all participants, regardless of their relative endorsement of symptoms 
of alexithymia, depression, or anxiety. This pronounced post-reappraisal stress response 
indicated that, contrary to the goal of this manipulation, even participants on the healthier side of 
the spectrum failed to receive any benefits from reappraisal on a physiological level, instead 
becoming increasingly distressed. Interestingly, although average subjectively reported affect 
showed no subjective benefits to be associated with reappraisal, it did not reflect the same pattern 
of increased distress following reappraisal as the physiological data. However, this dissociation 
may be best explained by examining this phenomenon on a group-by-group basis, and will be 
discussed presently. 
This unexpected pattern of physiological distress following reappraisal invites the 
question: what went wrong? Why did performing an ER technique that is widely held to be 
adaptive correspond with increased distress? To answer this question, an understanding of the 
goals and stipulations of reappraisal must be understood. As previously mentioned, reappraisal is 
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a technique in which individuals attempt to generate benign or positive interpretations of 
otherwise stressful situations (Gross, 1998b), and has been shown in the past to reduce 
physiological signs of stress (Kim & Hamann, 2012; Yuan et al., 2015) as well as increase HRV 
(Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 2011). However, while reappraisal can be an effective ER 
strategy, its relative success may depend on when it is implemented. A process model of ER put 
forward by Gross (1998a) suggests that emotional cues elicit behavioral, experimental, or 
physiological emotional response tendencies that aim to facilitate adaptive responses to 
perceived stressors, eventually informing the emotional response itself. Within this model, it is 
speculated that regulation can occur at more than one stage. Namely, Gross (1998a) identified 
two major classes of ER – antecedent-focused and response-focused (see Figure 8). As seen in 
Figure 8, antecedent-focused regulation occurs before response tendencies are fully formed, 
while response-focused regulation attempts to manipulate response tendencies after their 
formation. For example, a student who was concerned about an upcoming paper could anticipate 
experiencing writing-induced stress and engage in an antecedent-focused technique to reframe 
the task as a fun, creative writing exercise (in this case, a form of reappraisal) before engaging 
with the paper. Alternatively, this student could use a response-focused technique to try to limit 
outward signs of anxiety (e.g., fidgeting; a form of suppression) while writing. 
As indicated by the above example, reappraisal has been historically identified as an 
antecedent-focused ER strategy (Gross, 1998a), and past research has largely examined it as such 
(e.g., Denson et al., 2011; Kim & Hamann, 2012; Yuan et al., 2015). The present study, 
however, was based on past work that used reappraisal as a more response-focused ER strategy. 
For example, both Hofmann et al. (2009) and White and Soto (2017) asked participants to 
engage in reappraisal after stress induction and both associated reappraisal exercises with a 
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physiological change corresponding to reduced pre-speech distress. Similarly, in the context of 
this study, reappraisal was implemented after stress induction as a form of response-focused 
regulation. As such, reappraisal may have occurred after the formation of initial response 
tendencies, to use the language of Gross (1998a). Indeed, by examining the significant decrease 
in HRV from B1 to B2, along with corresponding changes in subjectively reported affect 
indicating increasing distress, it is clear that stress-related response tendencies were formed on 
both physiological and subjective levels prior to the reappraisal writing task taking place. With a 
stress response already formulating, it may have been too late to reframe the stressor in a positive 
light, rendering reappraisal ineffectual. In other words, based on Gross’ (1998a) model of ER, a 
stressor that has already elicited a “locked in” response may be more resistant to antecedent-
focused reframing – once the damage caused by the stressor is already done, decreasing distress 
may become more dependent on changing the response itself rather than reframing the cause. As 
to why reappraisal increased physiological indicators of stress, it stands to reason that an 
antecedent-focused ER strategy implemented too late in the emotional process may not only fail 
to alter the course of the emotional response, but may act as a reminder of the imminent stressful 
event. As the nature of reappraisal dictates, the prompt used in this experiment (“Write about all 
of the positive aspects of giving this speech, including what you may learn and how you may 
grow through the experience”) required participants to actively reengage with the looming 
stressor of the speech. As this prompt A) failed to reduce negative affect and B) forced 
participants to think about a stressor, it is conceivable that, rather than helping participants to feel 
better about the situation, this task acted as a form of imposed rumination, focusing attention on 
the causes and consequences of distress rather than it’s solutions (Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 
1998).  
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Overall, the findings of Study 2 point to the failure of reappraisal, at least in a response-
focused context,6 and serve to challenge its stereotypical role as an infallible ER technique. 
These unexpected results have several important implications regarding the adaptive use of 
reappraisal. First, although reappraisal is often categorized as an adaptive ER strategy, its relative 
success appears to be largely situational – individuals must understand not only how to 
implement reappraisal, but when. These findings are in line with a growing body of ER literature 
that suggests that no form of ER is inherently “good” or inherently “bad.” Rather, its value is 
defined by the situation in which it is used. For example, Wolgast and Lundh (2017) found that 
distraction (an ER technique that has long been ambiguously placed on the spectrum from 
“maladaptive” to “adaptive”) was adaptive (i.e., associated with well-being) when combined 
with active acceptance, or behavioral flexibility in the face of negative emotions, but 
maladaptive when combined with more avoidant strategies. On the other hand, while examining 
daily experience of positive and negative emotion using a daily diary technique, Brockman et al. 
(2017) found that strategies often presumed to be adaptive (such as reappraisal) conferred little to 
no benefit in the regulation of negative affect for close to half their sample. Troy et al. (2013) 
lend support to the presence of a contextual component of reappraisal by suggesting that the type 
of stressor involved in ER has an effect on its outcome, and that reappraisal used in the wrong 
situations can be associated with higher levels of depression. Similarly, the present study 
highlights the importance of choosing the right technique at the right time – not only can 
inappropriate engagement in reappraisal fail to decrease negative affect, it can actually increase 
distress on a physiological level. Together, these findings suggest that emotion dysregulation can 
occur not only on the level of strategy selection (e.g., choosing to use reappraisal over 
suppression), but also on the level of contextual strategy implementation (e.g., choosing when to 
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use reappraisal). This more nuanced model of emotion dysregulation conveys the import of ER 
education involved in therapies and other interventions – the individual must know not only the 
cognitive steps necessary to perform a certain ER strategy, but also at what point in the 
emotional process it should be implemented and under what circumstances it will be most 
effective. According to this model, reappraisal should be one of a larger repertoire of ER 
technique, each valuable in certain contexts. For example, this study found that reappraisal may 
fail in a context where the stressor cannot be anticipated or where Gross’s (1998a) emotional 
response tendencies are already formulated, thereby highlighting the need for contextually 
adaptive response-based ER techniques. 
Regardless of how it was conceptualized – antecedent-focused or otherwise – HRV data 
clearly indicated that nobody benefitted from reappraisal in this study, regardless of symptom 
severity or level of alexithymia. This phenomenon was reflected by the repeated measures 
ANOVAs performed with HRV as the DV that revealed no significant between subjects 
differences at any time point. The investigation of the proposed mediation models did, however, 
reveal a surprising trend towards significance: higher levels of alexithymia predicted a larger 
change from B2 to B3 at a marginally significant level. This suggests that individuals with 
alexithymia may have had more positive reappraisal outcomes. It is important to note, however, 
that due to the stress-inducing qualities of reappraisal in this study, this simply means that 
alexithymia was associated with a less negative reaction to reappraisal. As to why this effect was 
seen, individuals with alexithymia may have been spared from the generally detrimental effects 
of reappraisal by, ironically, the very feature that was expected to hinder their ER ability: a lack 
of emotional insight. These individuals, having presumably limited understanding of their 
emotions, may have had attenuated associations between the onset of negative affect and the 
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upcoming speech task. In other words, if reappraisal acted as a reminder of an imminent stressful 
event, it may not have caused as strong a resurgence of negative emotions in individuals with 
alexithymia as it did in the sample at large.  
In any case, the fact that individuals high in alexithymia experienced the same effects of 
reappraisal, if not a marginally less-negative outcome, as their less-alexithymic counterparts 
answers a major research question of this study. Namely, this study asked if previously observed 
associations between alexithymia and a reduced tendency to utilize reappraisal were due to 
individuals with alexithymia missing the cue to initiate regulation or lacking the ability to 
perform the technique itself. The present results demonstrate that alexithymia has little effect on 
explicit ER ability, at least in the case of response-based reappraisal, and suggest that past 
studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Subic-Wrana et al., 2014) may have been identifying an 
association between alexithymia/reduced emotional awareness and limited recognition of ER 
situations. This finding has important implications for the treatment of alexithymia, as it points to 
explicit ER strategies as a potentially effective method of overriding the ER deficits associated 
with alexithymia. For example, particular emphasis could be put on coaching individuals with 
alexithymia in the recognition of situations where engagement in ER is necessary, perhaps by 
relying on more concrete, non-emotional cues (e.g., teaching an individual to ask themselves 
“Was this an outcome I wanted or did not want?” to decide whether to engage in ER, rather than 
“Do I feel sad/disappointed/angry/etc.?”). It is important to note that this finding should be 
tempered by the fact that reappraisal generally manifested itself as a maladaptive ER strategy in 
this study. This means that a potential relationship between ER ability and alexithymia could 
have gone undetected due to the fact that nobody benefitted from reappraisal. Furthermore, this 
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implication should not be generalized to the context of antecedent-focused reappraisal until more 
research has been conducted. 
Subjectively Reported Affect 
Due to the failure of reappraisal on a general level, the stress induction at B2 marked the 
beginning of a downward spiral of distress (as shown by physiological data and largely agreeing 
subjective negative reports) that leveled off only after the speech was complete (see Figures 4 
and 5). However, while patterns of physiological distress were consistent between depression, 
anxiety, and alexithymia groups, a different pattern emerged in subjectively reported affect.  
Depression. For example, correlations between depression and subjectively reported 
negative affect suggested an association between depression and distress at B1 and B4, and a 
marginally significant between-subjects effect of depression on negative affect suggested an 
overall trend of increased subjective distress for individuals high in depression. Together, these 
findings point to an overall tendency for individuals high in depression to report more distress at 
multiple points during the task – a phenomenon that fits well with our understanding of 
depression as being characterized by persistent low mood (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). However, in addition to being closely associated with depressed mood, depression is also 
characterized by anhedonia, or a diminished ability to experience pleasure (Treadway, & Zald, 
2011). This particular feature may be best indexed by the positive component of the PANAS, 
which, in addition to measuring the absence of distress, is indicative of an individual’s level of 
engagement and excitement (using emotion words such as “interested, “enthusiastic, “inspired”; 
Crawford & Henry, 2004). In the context of subjectively reported positive affect, a significant 
interaction between depression and time was seen. This interaction was characterized by a 
tendency for individuals in the high depression group to report lower positive affect at the 
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beginning of the experiment (B1; see Figure 6). Based on these reports, it can be said that 
depression corresponded to a diminished sense of excitement about and interest in the upcoming 
study – a dissociation that may be indicative of some level of anhedonia among individuals high 
in depression. This finding is congruent with a growing body of literature that associates not only 
increased negative affect, but also dampened positive affect as a feature of depression, 
identifying both blunted momentary enjoyment of positive stimuli (Barch et al., 2016) and 
reduced ability to sustain subjective and neural responses to positive stimuli (McMakin, 
Santiago, & Shirk, 2009; Heller et al., 2009) among depressed individuals. Together, these 
phenomena involving both positive and negative affect serve to highlight the subjectively 
reported presence of classic MDD symptoms in a subclinical sample, shedding light on the 
difficulties associated with depression even on a nonclinical level. 
 Finally, the significant interaction effect exhibited in the context of subjectively reported 
positive affect may serve as evidence for decreased subjective reactivity among individuals high 
in depression. While participants in the low depression group began with relatively high reports 
of positive affect, the stress induction task brought them to levels of positive affect as low as 
those of the high depression group. However, no parallel change was seen among individuals 
high in depression. This suggests that, while they may report lower positive affect to begin with, 
individuals high in depression are less susceptible to further decreases in positive affect caused 
by changes in the environment. This phenomenon lends support to a theory of reactivity called 
emotion context insensitivity (ECI; Rottenberg, 2007). ECI suggests that depressed individuals 
exhibit reduced reactivity to emotional stimuli, both positive and negative – an effect that is 
exemplified in this study by the failure of a negative stimulus (stress induction via speech 
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instruction) to elicit a change in positive affect comparable to the change seen in the low 
depression group. 
 Anxiety. When comparing individuals high in anxiety to their healthier counterparts, 
similar dissociations in subjectively reported affect were seen. However, while members of the 
high anxiety group tended to report significantly higher levels of negative affect in general, no 
such effect was seen in terms of positive affect. Combined with the findings outlined above, this 
is supportive of past research that found elevated negative affect to be associated with both 
anxiety and depression, but reduced levels of positive affect to be associated with depression 
only (i.e., facilitated by depression-specific symptoms such as anhedonia; Watson, Clark, & 
Carey, 1988).  
While positive affect was largely unaffected by anxiety group membership, a significant 
interaction effect between anxiety and time revealed individuals in the high anxiety group to 
report increased negative affect at both B1 and B4 (see Figure 7). In other words, unlike the low 
anxiety group, whose stress spiked following stress induction before leveling off after the speech 
was completed, members of the high anxiety group both started off on a more distressed level (at 
B1) and continued to increase in stress through the end of the experiment (B4). While the reports 
of increased negative affect at B1 could be explained by the heightened anticipatory anxiety 
characteristic of anxiety disorders such as GAD7 (Paulus & Stein, 2006), this effect did not hold 
true at B2, where both the high and low anxiety group reported comparable levels of distress in 
anticipation of the upcoming speech. A more nuanced explanation of this effect, therefore, is 
informed by past research that has associated GAD with hypersensitivity to uncertain threat 
(Gorka et al., 2017). In this scenario, this could mean that while the nature of the experiment was 
still uncertain (at B1), members of the high anxiety group were disproportionately distressed. 
DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, ALEXITHYMIA IN ER                                                           75 
	
However, when the speech was announced and uncertainty was attenuated, this distress, while 
still high, was proportionate to that of the low anxiety group. As for the persisting subjective 
experience of distress at B4, this study suggests that anxiety may be associated with difficulty in 
returning to baseline after a stressful event. This conclusion is supported by Paulesu et al. (2010), 
who found that activation in brain regions corresponding to worry in individuals with GAD 
(medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate regions) persisted during resting states following 
exposure to worry-inducing sentences. Overall, these findings are indicative of the adverse 
effects that even subclinical anxiety can have on simple tasks performed in day-to-day life (e.g., 
participation in a psychology experiment leading to persisting subjective distress even after the 
experiment is over). 
Decoupling of Physiological and Subjective Emotional Experience 
 While the findings outlined above point to a differentiation of subjective affective 
experience as a function of symptom severity, it is important to remember that no such 
dissociation was seen on a physiological level. This suggests that subclinical depression and 
anxiety may be associated with a decoupling of physiological and subjective emotional 
experience. Interestingly, while a similar phenomenon has been identified in alexithymia (Stone 
& Nielson, 2001; Peasley-Miklus et al., 2016), the decoupling effects seen in this study appeared 
to be independent of alexithymia group membership, between which subjective and 
physiological data largely agreed. What’s more, this effect existed in the opposite direction of 
what would have been expected in the context of alexithymia – rather than failing to report a 
change in subjective affect, individuals high in depression and anxiety tended to over-report, 
expressing higher negative affect and lower positive affect despite displaying HRV that was 
statistically identical to healthier individuals.  
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In the case of depression, this decoupling phenomenon may be indicative of a negatively 
biased self-focus, where individuals with symptoms of depression overestimate signs of their 
own distress. The presence of heightened self-focus has been linked to MDD in the past, and has 
often been paired with a negative attentional bias (Lemogne et al., 2011). For example, fMRI 
studies have found depression to be associated with increased resting state functional 
connectivity between the default mode network (DMN) – a brain region associated with self-
referential thought – and brain regions such as the thalamus and other areas responsible for 
cognitive control (Sheline et al., 2010; Singh & Gotlib, 2014). This increased connectivity 
reflects a preoccupation with internally generated thought in depression – which may be 
negatively biased and ruminative – and represents a potential mechanism through which 
individuals with symptoms of depression may report negative affect that is disproportionate to 
their actual physiological arousal.  
While it is certainly conceivable that a similar internally oriented negative bias is present 
in individuals high in anxiety, this phenomenon is less well documented in the context of GAD. 
A similar physiological/subjective decoupling effect could, however, be caused by an entirely 
different mechanism in anxiety. For example, one model of panic disorder (PD) that has received 
equivocal empirical support suggests that panic attacks stem from a “catastrophic 
misinterpretation” of autonomic arousal stimuli. This initial misinterpretation sets off a positive 
feedback loop of physiological distress and further misinterpretations, which eventually result in 
a panic attack (Austin & Richards, 2006). While PD and subclinical GAD are by no means 
identical (and the results of this study reflect no positive feedback loop), this model suggests that 
individuals with anxiety may exhibit heightened sensitivity to physiological arousal. In other 
words, rather than the cognitive bias towards negative and ruminative thought that is associated 
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with depression, individuals high in anxiety may be more likely to read into their more physical 
bodily cues. In support of this notion, Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004 used ambulatory monitors to track 
physiological data over the course of 4 days, and found individuals with both PD and GAD to be 
more sensitive to bodily changes than non-anxious individuals. Together, these studies are 
indicative of an attentional bias to physiological arousal among individuals high in anxiety that 
may result in the decoupling of physiological and subjective emotional experience. 
Overall, the comparison of subjective and physiological data indicates a common 
decoupling phenomenon within subclinical depression and anxiety. While the mechanisms 
behind this phenomenon may be unique to the separate constructs, an understanding of both may 
prove beneficial in therapeutic settings, where individuals with depressive and anxious 
symptoms could be instructed in techniques that combat tendencies to engage in negative, self-
focused thinking and read into physiological cues, respectively. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 First, it is important to note that certain potential influencers of participants’ HRV were 
not controlled for in this study. Namely, the participants’ body mass index (BMI) and psychiatric 
medication history was unknown. However, while studies such as Licht et al. (2009) found an 
observed relationship between HRV and anxiety disorders to be mediated by medication, the 
lack of significant relationship between symptoms of depression, anxiety, alexithymia and HRV 
suggests that this may be a nonissue. In other words, as HRV data were already considered as 
statistically identical across groups, further attenuation of group differences caused by 
controlling for medication would have no confounding effect on this study or its implications. 
 Furthermore, it would be negligent not to mention that several of the effects outlined 
above were of only marginal significance (with some teetering on the brink of significance, e.g., 
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p = .054). While these findings and their implications were discussed within this study, they 
should be interpreted with caution. However, the interpretation of these marginally significant 
findings is still valuable, especially through a Fisherian lens, and may be indicative of trends that 
would be more pronounced in a more clinical sample. Categorical analyses should also be 
regarded critically due to A) low sample size in certain groups (e.g., high anxiety, n = 10) and 
correspondingly low power,8 and B) the use of categorical analysis to examine a largely 
dimensional variable (alexithymia). More specifically, alexithymia was categorized using 
median split techniques, which are inherently prone to power reduction (McClelland et al., 
2015). 
 Finally, while this study examines both symptoms of depression and anxiety, analyses 
using these variables occurred independently. In other words, no analyses were conducted to 
compare comorbid anxiety and depression symptoms with the symptoms of either disorder as an 
orthogonal construct. The presence of symptom comorbidity should be considered when 
interpreting the results corresponding to one specific disorder or the other.  
Conclusion and Future Directions 
 Overall, this study identified several interesting trends, each with an important 
implication. First, this study demonstrated the failure of reappraisal, across groups, as a 
response-focused ER strategy. This finding lends support to a contextual model of ER that, rather 
than suggesting that certain techniques are universally adaptive while others are universally 
maladaptive, determines the value of ER strategies on a situational basis. This model of ER holds 
important implications for the future treatment of emotion dysregulation as it suggests that 
“adaptive” ER techniques implemented at the wrong time may have unintended negative effects, 
and points to the need for a flexible and diverse repertoire of ER strategies. Second, this study 
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did not find alexithymia to be associated with greater explicit ER difficulty. Although this 
finding should be interpreted with the knowledge of reappraisal’s failure in mind, it could point 
to instructed reappraisal as a viable ER technique for individuals with alexithymia, especially if 
paired with a non-emotional strategy aimed at identifying when to use it in the first place. Third, 
this study found subjective trends corresponding to deficits of clinical depression and anxiety on 
a subclinical level. These included subjectively reported depressed mood and anhedonia in the 
case of subclinical depression, and a heightened subjective sensitivity to uncertain threat as well 
as difficulty returning to baseline following a stressful event in the case of subclinical anxiety. 
This is indicative of an intensified subjective emotional experience for individuals suffering from 
symptoms of depression and anxiety, and points to a need for symptom alleviation and 
intervention even on a subclinical level. Finally, this study demonstrated a decoupling of 
physiological and subjective emotional experience in the context of subclinical depression and 
anxiety, but not alexithymia. This decoupling phenomenon may represent increased negative 
self-referential thought (in the case of high depression) and a bias to over-interpret or read into 
physiological arousal (in the case of high anxiety). These potential mechanisms could be 
addressed by interventions designed to limit focus on and reduce negative biases regarding 
internal states and physiological cues.   
 Future research should continue to focus on ER from a contextual standpoint, identifying 
precisely when certain ER techniques are adaptive, and when they may backfire. Furthermore, a 
similar study conducted with reappraisal as an antecedent-focused strategy rather than a 
response-focused strategy may yield more telling results about the role of alexithymia in ER. 
Namely, such a study could foster an understanding of the effect of alexithymia on explicitly 
instructed reappraisal within a presumably more adaptive context. Finally, future research should 
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examine in more detail the potential decoupling between physiological and subjective emotional 
experience in depression and anxiety in the pursuit of intervention techniques that target the mis- 
or over-interpretation of physiological distress in these disorders. 
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General Discussion 
The goal of the present studies was to explore the nature of the relationship between 
depressive/anxious symptoms and alexithymia in the context of both implicit and explicit ER. 
These studies yielded results that bear significant implications regarding the measurement of 
implicit ER in the case of Study 1, and the nature of reappraisal and its intersection with 
alexithymia, as well as the specific influences of depression and anxiety on emotional experience 
in the case of Study 2. While both studies yielded interesting findings independently, the failure 
of the implicit ER paradigm in Study 1 makes it difficult to draw broader comparisons between 
the effects of depression, anxiety, and alexithymia on implicit versus explicit ER. However, the 
findings of Study 2 do answer this research question in part, suggesting that alexithymia may not 
be a negative influence on explicit ER ability, at least in the case of response-based reappraisal. 
Furthermore, the highly significant relationships between scores on depression, anxiety, and 
alexithymia scales in both Study 1 and Study 2 are consistent with past research (Honkalampi et 
al., 2000; Onur et al., 2013) and are indicative of a strong association between these constructs 
even within subclinical populations. 
Strengths and Limitations 
As mentioned in Study 1, the use of subclinical samples in these studies was both a 
strength and a limitation. While it allowed for the validation of clinically supported deficits on a 
subclinical level, the nature of these samples may have attenuated certain effects that would have 
been more robust within a clinical sample. Especially in terms of alexithymia, the manifestation 
of which varies according to the nature of the population in which it is observed (de Haan et al., 
2012; Karukivi & Saarijärvi, 2014), the findings of these studies cannot necessarily be 
generalized to clinical populations, where alexithymia may produce drastically different effects 
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on ER ability. Similarly, the relative homogeneity of the samples (72.3% White in Study 1, 
69.4% White in Study 2), while beneficial in terms of internal validity, limits the generalizability 
of these studies’ results.  
 Concerning the measurement of alexithymia, both studies exhibited limited internal 
consistency associated with the Externally Oriented Thinking (EOT) subscale of the TAS-20. 
This suggests that revision to the items making up this subscale may be beneficial to the 
measurement of this particular aspect of alexithymia. Finally, with the historical limitations of 
the TAS-20 in mind, neither study was able to deconstruct alexithymia into its cognitive and 
affective components, which limited the level of specificity that could be achieved in analysis. 
As a whole, however, both Study 1 and Study 2 found the overall scale to be internally 
consistent, suggesting that the TAS-20 succeeded at measuring a unitary construct whether or not 
it comprised both the cognitive and affective dimension of alexithymia. 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
 Overall, these studies provide important insight into the relationships between depression, 
anxiety, alexithymia, and ER in a college environment – a setting where awareness of mental 
health issues has been rapidly on the rise. More specifically, Study 1 offers implications 
regarding the ECT and the measurement of implicit ER, while Study 2 helps to qualify 
reappraisal as a contextually adaptive ER technique while demonstrating unique effects of 
depression and anxiety on the emotional experience of a subclinical sample. While questions 
regarding the effects of depression, anxiety, and alexithymia on ER remain, especially in the 
context of implicit ER, these studies offer an initial glimpse into the intersections between these 
constructs and establishes a number of findings that can inform both future research as well as 
the treatment of subclinical psychopathology and emotion dysregulation. 
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 Future research should continue to explore the relationships outlined in these studies, 
focusing on implicit ER and other forms of explicit ER, including antecedent-focused 
reappraisal. Furthermore, these experiments should be replicated within clinical populations to 
determine whether the effects seen in these studies are amplified or altered by the level of 
psychopathology within a given sample. Finally, the findings of the present studies (Study 2 in 
particular), should be further investigated in the pursuit of developing therapies and interventions 
that take into account the effects of alexithymia on ER as well as the unique challenges presented 
by depression and anxiety on a subclinical level. 
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Footnotes 
1The strengths and weakness of “adaptive” and “maladaptive” ER techniques are discussed in 
more detail in the context of Study 2. 
2 In this study, this effect is referred to as both “emotional conflict priming” and “emotional 
conflict resolution”. 
3 This theory is at odds with Diborde et al.’s (2004) aforementioned finding that nonclinical 
samples with alexithymia exhibited deficits corresponding to the cognitive dimension of 
alexithymia only while both the cognitive and affective dimensions of alexithymia were 
implicated within a clinical population. This particular finding, however, was studied in the 
context of eating disorders and therefore cannot necessarily be generalized to distress disorders. 
4 Past studies have largely examined a general association between alexithymia and ER 
techniques (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Subic-Wrana et al., 2014) without explicitly instructing 
individuals to actually engage in ER. 
5 In this study, the term “baseline” refers to inter-task periods in which participants completed 
the PANAS before being instructed to sit still for 2 minutes as to establish an unadulterated HRV 
data point. This term does not necessarily denote the absence or presence of an experimental 
manipulation. 
6 It is possible that reappraisal succeeded as an antecedent-focused ER strategy by reducing 
negative affect during the speech itself, which took place after the reappraisal exercise. However, 
because all participants engaged in reappraisal, there was no control group and thus no way to 
determine the relative effectiveness of reappraisal at this time point. 
7 Though more well-validated in social anxiety disorder. 
8 Although power was optimized through the use of repeated-measures ANOVAs. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Two proposed mediation models for the relationship between alexithymia, symptoms 
of depression/anxiety, and ER. 
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Figure 2. Changes to the congruency effect on trial n as a product of trial n-1. 
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Figure 3. Procedural diagram of the Emotion Regulation Task (ERT; adapted from White & 
Soto, 2017). 
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Figure 4. Mean heart rate variability (HRV) over time, across all participants.  
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Figure 5. Mean subjectively reported affect over time, across all participants. 
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Figure 6. Subjectively reported positive affect as a factor of Group (high depression vs. low 
depression) x Time. Note: points of marginal significant difference (p = .054) are marked with an 
*. 
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Figure 7. Subjectively reported negative affect as a factor of Group (high anxiety vs. low 
anxiety) x Time. Note: points of significant difference (p < .05) are marked with an *.	
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Figure 8. A process model of emotion regulation (adapted from Gross, 1998a). 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
